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SOME SEE SLAP TO SJC IN RULING ON PARADE
To Others, U.S. Only Bolstering Principle
The Boston Globe
Copyright 1995
Wednesday, June 21, 1995
Michael Rezendes, Globe Staff
The unusual 9-0 ruling by the U.S. Supreme
Court upholding the free speech right of a South
Boston group to bar a gay and lesbian organization
from the St. Patrick's Day parade is being seen by
some legal scholars as an embarrassing rebuke to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
"I was mystified by the SJC when it ruled in favor
of the gay marchers," said Laurence Tribe, a
constitutional law scholar at Harvard Law School. "It
now seems to have been a fairly considerable judicial
blooper."
At the same time, other legal analysts say the
U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous ruling on Monday
may have sprung from a successful attempt by Justice
David Souter to craft a simple decision based on
fidamental First Amendment principles that glossed
over potentially more complex aspects of the case.
"The right to equal access and the right to free
speech have been clashing for many years," said Marc
Perlin, a professor at Suffolk Law School. "A day later
we can say that this is a court that is very strong on
the right to free speech."
A year ago, the SJC, on a 4-1 vote, ruled that an
attempt by the Allied War Veterans Council of South
Boston to exclude an organization of gay marchers
from the parade was discriminatory. Issued after two
years of emotional debate over one of the city's most
revered traditions, the SJC's decision was also
consistent with a lower court's 1992 temporary order
allowing gay marchers to take part in the parade that
year, and again in 1993.
But Tribe and others who take issue with the SJC
say that the free speech right of South Boston
organizers to tailor the message of the parade by
excluding gay marchers was always clear, and that the
Supreme Court's unanimous ruling shows that the SJC
should have known better.
"Just as gays marching on Gay Pride Day should
be able to exclude anti-gay messages, the South
Boston parade organizers have a clear right under the
First Amendment to decide who should participate,"
Tribe said. "The issue seemed so clear-cut I really
couldn't understand why the SJC decision came out
the way it did."
Harvey Silverglate, a past president of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts,
said that the SJC in recent years has shown an
increasing willingness to sacrifice the right to free
speech in order to protect groups that have been
victims of historic discrimination. He said the
unanimity of the Supreme Court's decision is an
unmistakable message that the road taken by the SJC
to protect these groups veers too far from the
Constitution.
"This isn't rocket science," Silverglate said. "The
SJC was making a calculated, political decision to
deviate from the clear import of the First Amendment
in a misguided attempt to help a disadvantaged group,
and it backfired 9-0."
Citing a pattern of what he sees as "political
correctness" at the SJC, Silverglate also said the
Supreme Court's decision on the parade bolsters
chances for an anticipated Supreme Court appeal of
another Massachusetts free speech case. In that case,
the SJC ruled that David Heller was not within his
free speech rights when he pasted photographs of a
co-worker, Sylvia Bowman, over nude magazine
spreads during a union election.
Some legal analysts insist that the Supreme
Court's unanimo U.S. decision does not reflect
negatively on the Masschusetts court.
"Each court has its function and we need both
courts," said Morris Goldings, a noted criminal
attorney who has been involved in First Amendment
cases. "It's healthy to have this kind of debate between
the courts."
Goldings also said it is proper for state courts to
act as "laboratories of democracy" by exploring new
legal terrain, and proper for the U.S. Supreme Court
to rein in local courts when their innovations stray too
far from the Constitution.
Furthermore, Goldings and other attorneys believe
Souter may have achieved the court's extraordinary
9-0 vote by recasting the case in fundamental First
Amendment terms. "It's really too simplistic to say the
Supreme Court reversed the SJC. What it did was
start from a different premise," Goldings said.
Larry Yackle, an attorney who helped prepare the
Supreme Court brief filed on behalf of the
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, said the Supreme Court had reached its
decision by viewing the arguments presented in the
case on its own terms.
For instance, Yackle noted that, in arguing that
organizers of the parade seek to express little but pride
in an Irish heritage, gay marchers said in their legal
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brief that the function of the South Boston veterans is
akin to that of a maitre d' at a restaurant - someone
who includes participants of varying opinions but has
no point of view himself.
"We never said there was no expressive value in
selecting participants to the St. Patrick's Day parade;
we just think it wasn't very much," Yackle said.
Souter, however, chose to compare the veterans to
a composer of an orchestral musical score who
"selects the expressive units of the parade from
potential participants." And all eight of his colleages
agreed.
According to Tribe, the Supreme Court's 9-0
ruling reflects the diminished reputation of the
Massachusetts high court - a 302-year-old institution
long admired as the oldest appellate court in
continuous existence in the hemisphere.
"There certainly was a time when the SJC was
widely regarded as one of the finest state courts in the
country," Tribe said. "But it hasn't occupied the
position of high distinction that Massachusetts can
expect of its highest court in quite a long time."
Gov. Weld touched on the SJC's tarnished image
yesterday, when he nominated controversial Harvard
Law professor Charles Fried to fill a vacancy on the
seven-member court. "This guy would elevate the
status and stature of our supreme court," Weld said.
"We can't afford to pass this guy up."
Fried, when asked how the SJC and the Supreme
Court could have differed so definitively, declined to
be specific but seemed to acknowledge the Supreme
Court's point of view. "Having gotten some things
wrong in the course of my lifetime I think I'll leave
that unanswered," he said.
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John J. HURLEY and
South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, Petitioners,
V.
IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON, etc.,
et al.
No. 94-749
63 USLW 4625
Argued April 25, 1995.
Decided June 19, 1995.
Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether Massachusetts
may require private citizens who organize a parade to
include among the marchers a group imparting a
message the organizers do not wish to convey. We
hold that such a mandate violates the First
Amendment.
I
1992 was the year that a number of gay, lesbian,
and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants
joined together with other supporters to form the
respondent organization, GLIB, to march in the [south
Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade] as a way to express
pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals, to demonstrate that there are
such men and women among those so descended, and
to express their solidarity with like individuals who
sought to march in New York's St. Patrick's Day
Parade. Although the Council denied GLIB's
application to take part in the 1992 parade, GLIB
obtained a state-court order to include its contingent,
which marched "uneventfully" among that year's
10,000 participants and 750,000 spectators.
In 1993, after the Council had again refused to
admit GLIB to the upcoming parade, the organization
and some of its members filed this suit against the
Council, the individual petitioner John J. "Wacko"
Hurley, and the City of Boston, alleging violations of
the State and Federal Constitutions and of the state
public accommodations law, which prohibits "any
distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of
. . sexual orientation .. . relative to the admission of
any person to, or treatment in any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement."
Mass.Gen.Laws s 272:98.
The court held that because the statute did not
mandate inclusion of GLIB but only prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation, any
infringement on the Council's right to expressive
association was only "incidental" and "no greater than
necessary to accomplish the statute's legitimate
purpose" of eradicating discrimination. Accordingly,
it ruled that "GLIB is entitled to participate in the
Parade on the same terms and conditions as other
participants."
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed, seeing nothing clearly erroneous in the trial
judge's findings that GLIB was excluded from the
parade based on the sexual orientation of its members,
that it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose
in the parade, that there was no state action, and that
the parade was a public accommodation within the
meaning of §272:92A.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the
requirement to admit a parade contingent expressing
a message not of the private organizers' own choosing
violates the First Amendment. We hold that it does
and reverse.
A
If th r w r no fnenn mr gromn of npen1e to
march from here to there except to reach a destination,
they could make the trip without expressing any
message beyond the fact of the march itself. Some
people might call such a procession a parade, but it
would not be much of one. Real "[p]arades are public
dramas of social relations, and in them performers
define who can be a social actor and what subjects and
ideas are available for communication and
consideration." Hence, we use the word "parade" to
indicate marchers who are making some sort of
collective point, not just to each other but to
bystanders along. the way. Indeed a parade's
dependence on watchers is so extreme that nowadays,
as with Bishop Berkeley's celebrated tree, "if a parade
or demonstration receives no media coverage, it may
as well not have happened." Parades are thus a form
of expression, not just motion, and the inherent
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expressiveness of marching to make a point explains
our cases involving protest marches....
The protected expression that inheres in a parade
is not limited to its banners and songs, however, for
the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken
words as mediums of expression. Noting that
"[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas," our cases have recognized that
the First Amendment shields such acts as saluting a
flag (and refusing to do so), wearing an arm band to
protest a war, displaying a red flag, and even
"[m]arching, walking or parading" in uniforms
displaying the swastika. As some of these examples
show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not
a condition of constitutional protection, which if
confined to expressions conveying a "particularized
message," would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.
Respondents' participation as a unit in the parade
was equally expressive. GLIB was formed for the
very purpose of marching in it as the trial court found,
in order to celebrate its members' identity as openly
gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish
immigrants, to show that there are such individuals in
the community, and to support the like men and
women who sought to march in the New York parade.
The organization distributed a fact sheet describing
the members' intentions, and the record otherwise
corroborates the expressive nature of GLIB's
participation. In 1993, members of GLIB marched
behind a shamrock-strewn banner with the simple
inscription "Irish American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston." GLIB understandably
seeks to communicate its ideas as part of the existing
parade, rather than staging one of its own.
C
In the case before us, . . . the Massachusetts law
has been applied in a peculiar way. Its enforcement
does not address any dispute about the participation of
openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various
units admitted to the parade. The petitioners disclaim
any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no
individual member of GLIB claims to have been
excluded from parading as a member of any group that
the Council has approved to march. Instead, the
disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its
own parade unit carrying its own banner. Since every
participating unit affects the message conveyed by the
private organizers, the state courts' application of the
statute produced an order essentially requiring
petitioners to alter the expressive content of their
parade. Although the state courts spoke of the parade
as a place of public accommodation, once the
expressive character of both the parade and the
marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes
apparent that the state courts' application of the statute
had the effect of declaring the sponsors' speech itself
to be the public accommodation. Under this approach
any contingent of protected individuals with a
message would have the right to participate in
petitioners' speech, so that the communication
produced by the private organizers would be shaped
by all those protected by the law who wished to join
in with some expressive demonstration of their own.
But this use of the State's power violates the
fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message.
"Since all speech inherently involves choices of
what to say and what to leave unsaid," one important
manifestation of the principle of free speech is that
one who chooses to speak may also decide "what not
to say." Although the State may at times "prescribe
what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising" by
requiring the dissemination of "purely factual and
uncontroversial information," outside that context it
may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the
speaker disagrees. Indeed this general rule, that the
speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not
only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement,
but equally to statements of fact the speaker would
rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law
of defamation. Nor is the rule's benefit restricted to
the press, being enjoyed by business corporations
generally and by ordinary people engaged in
unsophisticated expression as well as by professional
publishers. Its point is simply the point of all speech
protection, which is to shield just those choices of
content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even
hurtful.
Petitioners' claim to the benefit of this principle of
autonomy to control one's own speech is as sound as
the South Boston parade is expressive. Rather like a
composer, the Council selects the expressive units of
the parade from potential participants, and though the
score may not produce a particularized message, each
contingent's expression in the Council's eyes comports
with what merits celebration on that day. Even if this
view gives the Council credit for a more considered
judgment than it actively made, the Council clearly
decided to exclude a message it did not like from the
communication it chose to make, and that is enough to
invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its
expression by speaking on one subject while
remaining silent on another. The message it
disfavored is not difficult to identify. Although
GLIB's point (like the Council's) is not wholly
articulate, a contingent marching behind the
organization's banner would at least bear witness to
the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual,
and the presence of the organized marchers would
suggest their view that people of their sexual
orientations have as much claim to unqualified social
acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of
parade units organized around other identifying
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characteristics. The parade's organizers may not
believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or
they may object to unqualified social acceptance of
gays and lesbians or have some other reason for
wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the parade.
But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of
a speaker not to propound a particular point of view,
and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the
government's power to control.
Parades and demonstrations, in contrast, are not
understood to be so neutrally presented or selectively
viewed. Unlike the programming offered on various
channels by a cable network, the parade does not
consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen
to be transmitted together for individual selection by
members of the audience. Although each parade unit
generally identifies itself, each is understood to
contribute something to a common theme, and
accordingly there is no customary practice whereby
private sponsors disavow "any identity of viewpoint"
between themselves and the selected participants.
Practice follows practicability here, for such
disclaimers would be quite curious in a moving
parade. Without deciding on the precise significance
of the likelihood of misattribution, it nonetheless
becomes clear that in the context of an expressive
parade, as with a protest march, the parade's overall
message is distilled from the individual presentations
along the way, and each unit's expression is perceived
by spectators as part of the whole.
The statute, Mass.Gen.Laws § 272:98, is a piece
of protective legislation that announces no purpose
beyond the object both expressed and apparent in its
provisions, which is to prevent any denial of access to
(or discriminatory treatment in) public
accommodations on proscribed grounds, including
sexual orientation. On its face, the object of the law
is to ensure by statute for gays and lesbians desiring to
make use of public accommodations what the old
common law promised to any member of the public
wanting a mean at the inn, that accepting the usual
terms of service, they will not be turned away merely
on the proprietor's exercise of personal preference.
When the law is applied to expressive activity in the
way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to
require speakers to modify the content of their
expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law
choose to alter it with messages of their own. But in
the absence of some further, legitimate end, this object
is merely to allow exactly what the general rule of
speaker's autonomy forbids.
It might, of course, have been argued that a
broader objective is apparent: that the ultimate point
of forbidding acts of discrimination toward certain
classes is to produce a society free of the
corresponding biases. Requiring access to a speaker's
message would thus be not an end in itself, but a
means to produce speakers free of the biases, whose
expressive conduct would be at least neutral toward
the particular classes, obviating any future need for
correction. But if this indeed is the point of applying
the state law to expressive conduct, it is a decidedly
fatal objective. Having availed itself of the public
thoroughfares "for purposes of assembly [and]
communicating thoughts between citizens," the
Council is engaged in a use of the streets that has
"from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." Our
tradition of free speech commands that a speaker who
takes to the street corner to express his views in this
way should be free from interference by the State
based on the content of what he says. The very idea
that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to
produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some
groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First
Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a
proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox
expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain
antithesis. While the law is free to promote all sorts
of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free
to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose
may strike the government.
IV
Our holding today rests not on any particular view
about the Council's message but on the Nation's
commitment to protect freedom of speech.
Disapproval of a private speaker's statement does not
legitimize use of the Commonwealth's power to
compel the speaker to alter the message by including
one more acceptable to others. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court is reversed
and the case remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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COURT SAYS NO TO GAY MARCHERS
Boston Herald
Copyright 1995
Tuesday, June 20, 1995
Maggie Mulvihill
South Boston St. Patrick's Day parade organizers
won a stunning victory in their bid to exclude gay
marchers as the U.S. Supreme Court backed the ban
as a First Amendment right.
"This entire issue should have been resolved in
the state courts, and except for political correctness
also known as politically chicken, I think it could have
been," said parade leader John J. "Wacko" Hurley.
Hurley, head of the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council which sponsors the parade,
declared: "No one with a message we consider
offensive to the people of South Boston is welcome."
The high court decision poses a political dilemma
for Mayor Thomas M. Menino, who last year
boycotted the controversial parade.
Gay activists are pushing Menino to host a
city-sponsored alternative parade to sidestep the
Supreme Court-sanctioned ban in South Boston.
But Menino, facing political pressure on both
sides of the issue, was non-committal, and the war
veterans group would not budge.
Gay leader David O'Connor said, "It would be a
real shame if the premier celebration of Boston's
Irish-American community would be the Allied War
Veteran's divisive, discriminatory parade."
O'Connor, 27, co-chair of the Irish-American Gay
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB), called
on Menino "to organize a citywide parade that would
honor all groups like our own who want to be
included. We know him as a man of principle who
took a firm stand against the War Veterans in this
case and we believe he will stick to his commitments."
But Menino spokeswoman Jacque Goddard said,
"The city does not host parades." She said Menino
will host a St. Patrick's celebration on City Hall Plaza
- with all invited - as he did last year.
Chester Darling, lawyer for the conservative
South Boston Allied War Veterans which sponsors
the parade, predicted "no olive branch" to the
Irish-American Gay Lesbians and Bisexuals Group.
"I doubt my clients will be offering GLIB much
of anything," said Darling, repeating the veterans'
battle cry that "sexual politics" be left out of the
Southie parade.
The Supreme Court's unanimous ruling allows the
veterans to ban the gays, or any other group, because
the St. Patrick's Day parade is a First Amendment
expression of free speech.
Goddard said, "We'll try to lobby for inclusion.
But the mayor understands the court ruling and he
understands that the veterans have the legal right to
make a choice about who should march."
Menino meanwhile has his own political fallout
with which to deal. The mayor said he has "no regrets"
about his decision last year to boycott the
controversial South Boston parade.
"At the time, the law of the land was that they
(gays marchers) couldn't be excluded. The Supreme
Court has made a 9-0 decision, which is very unusual.
We'll continue to support the law of the land," he said.
The mayor said he'll "be in South Boston" next
St. Patrick's Day, and will march if invited by the
parade organizers.
The Supreme Court agreed with the veterans
group that state court rulings in 1992 and 1993
forcing it to include GLIB violated its own free speech
rights.
In a decision authored by fellow New Englander,
Justice David H. Souter, the majority stated: "We hold
that such a mandate violates the First Amendment."
"I'm trying very hard not to gloat," said City
Council President Jim Kelly of South Boston, one of
the most outspoken supporters of the veteran's
decision to bar GLIB from marching.
But gay activists criticized the high court ruling.
"It's a very unfortunate and divisive decision,"
said former City Councilor David Scondras, who is
openly gay. "But it is consistent with the court's
previous homophobic rulings in which everyone else's
First Amendment protections are more important than
those belonging to gay people."
Chester Darling, the veteran's attorney who
argued their case before the Supreme Court in
February, shot back: "My clients do not hate gay
people. David Scondras was always invited to
participate in the parade and the veterans made
nothing of it. This has nothing to do with gay rights.
My clients just wanted to run an old-fashioned parade
free of sexual politics."
-David Weber contributed to this story.
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REINED OUT OF THE PARADE
The Washington Times
Copyright 1995
Wednesday, June 21, 1995
Bruce Fein
Last Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court in a rare
display of unanimity ruled that private parade
organizers enjoyed a First Amendment right to prevent
homosexuals from hijacking the event to promote a
gay and lesbian rights agenda.
Writing for the court in Hurley vs.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston (GLIB) (June 19, 1995), Justice David Souter
explained that freedom of speech includes the right to
reject endorsement of opinions or messages that the
speaker either opposes or wishes to avoid.
The Hurley case speaks more of the paranoia of
gays and lesbians than it does of homophobia, and
suggests that the homosexual vanguard suffers from
that same type of conspiratorial delusions as
right-wing militia organizations and National Rifle
Association members who see the Gestapo behind
every federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officer.
The evolution of the Hurley litigation is edifying.
March 17 has traditionally been set aside in Boston to
celebrate both St. Patrick and the evacuation of royal
troops and Loyalists occasioned by the guns captured
at Ticonderoga and set up on Dorchester Heights
under Gen. George Washington's command. Since
1947, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council,
a private association composed of various
representatives of South Boston veterans groups,
successfully applied for a permit to conduct a St.
Patrick's Day Evacuation Day parade. No other
applicant has ever applied.
In 1992 a number of gay, lesbian and bisexual
descendants of Irish immigrants formed GLIB hoping
to arh ii tuhe Vetemn-s Council parade to vokice uir~l
pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian and
bisexual, to demonstrate that Irish descendants include
homosexuals, and to show solidarity with counterparts
in New York seeking to march in New York's St.
Patrick's Day parade. GLIB did not, however, apply
for a permit to conduct its own parade in Boston, and
declined to allege that an application would have been
nixed.
In 1993, GLIB sued the council under a
Massachusetts public accommodation law for
declining its request to march as a group with a
banner in the council's St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation
Day parade to promote its homosexual rights agenda.
Evidence that the council's rejection was tainted by
homophobia was imaginary. Although the council's
selection criteria were more ecumenical than sectarian,
it had excluded the Ku Klux Klan, an anti-busing
group, and an anti-gay group to avoid disharmony or
unduly distracting the focus of the March 17
celebration. Further, the council welcomed GLIB
members to march in the parade as individuals.
Neither was homophobia afoot in either
Massachusetts or South Boston generally. Indeed, the
state legislature had recently amended its laws to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of "sexual
orientation" in "the admission of any person to, or
treatment in any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement." And Jeff Epperly, editor of Bay
Windows, a weekly gay-oriented newspaper covering
New England remarked after the Hurley decision: "I
do believe [the council] really got upset, mainly,
because some outside group [was] trying to tell them
how to run their parade. I know plenty of gay men in
South Boston. I'm not sure how open they are, but
I've never heard any stories of overt hostility."
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that GLIB could not be excluded from the
council's parade because of the state statutory
protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, and that their compelled inclusion
was inoffensive to the council's freedom of speech and
association. The Supreme Court reversed in a lucid
opinion that knifed through volumes of legal fog.
Justice Souter elaborated with irreproachable
insight: "[L]ike a composer, the council selects the
expressive units of the parade from potential
participants, and though the score may not produce a
particularized message, each contingent's expression
in the Council's eyes comports with what merits
celebration on that day. Even if this view gives the
Council credit for a more considered judgment than it
actively made, the Council clearly decided to exclude
a message it did not like from the communication it
chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right
as a private speaker to shape its expression by
speaking on one subject while remaining silent on
another."
Justice Souter recognized the gay and lesbian
rights agenda that GLIB hoped to smuggle into the
parade: "[AJ contingent marching behind [GLIB's]
banner would at least bear witness to the fact that
some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the
presence of organized marchers would suggest their
view that people of their sexual orientation have as
much claim to unqualified social acceptance as
heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units
[like veterans] organized around other identifying
characteristics." The First Amendment, Justice Souter
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lectured, prohibited conscripting the council's parade
into endorsing unqualified social acceptance of
homosexuals and related GLIB commandments.
Several gay rights crusaders assailed the Hurley
ruling as the offspring of homophobia. Frank
Kameny, a District gay rights vocalist, maintained that
the only St. Patrick's Day tradition upheld by the
decision "is the tradition of homophobia." Marie
Honan, a spokeswoman for GLIB, echoed that,
"Whatever the courts say, the issue is still
homophobia." But to paraphrase Sam Johnson, the
slander of homophobia is the last refuge of a group
unable to garner support for its agenda in the free
marketplace of ideas. Or as Oliver Cromwell might
have urged GLIB as he did the General Assembly of
the Church of Scotland. "I beseech you, in the bowels
of Christ, think it possible you may be nistaken."
Bruce Fein is a lawyer and free-lance writer
specializing in legal issues.
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94-1893 U.S. v. CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC
TELEPHONE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA
Cable television-Ban against local telephone
companies providing video programming to sub-
scribers-First Amendment.
Ruling below (CA 4, 42 F.3d 181, 63 LW
2348):
Provision of 1984 Cable Communications Poli-
cy Act that bars telephone companies and their
affiliates from providing video programming to
subscribers in their service areas, 42 USC 533(b),
is not narrowly tailored to serve government's
significant interests in promoting competition in
video programming market and in preserving di-
versity of communications media ownership, does
not leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of information, and therefore vio-
lates First Amendment.
Question presented: Does 47 USC 533(b),
which bars local telephone companies from di-
rectly providing video programming to subscrib-
ers in their telephone service areas, violate First
Amendment?
94-1900 NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION AS-
SOCIATION INC. v. BELL ATLANTIC CORP.
Cable television-Ban against local telephone
companies entering market-First Amendment.
Ruling below (Chesapeake and Potomac Tele-
phone Company of Virginia v. U.S., CA 4, 42
F.3d 181, 63 LW 2348):
Provision of 1984 Cable Communications Poli-
cy Act that bars telephone companies and their
affiliates from providing video programming to
subscribers in their service areas, 42 USC 533(b),
is not narrowly tailored to serve government's
significant interests in promoting competition in
video programming market and in preserving di-
versity of communications media ownership, does
not leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of information, and therefore vio-
lates First Amendment.
Question presented: Did court of appeals incor-
rectly hold that 47 USC 533(b)-enacted in
1984 as presumptive bar on local telephone mo-
nopolies' entering cable television business in
Petition for certiorari filed 5/17/95, by Drew their telephone-service areas, but allowing entry
S. Days III, Sol. Gen., George J. Phillips, Acting when there is good cause-is invalid under FirstS. Dys 11, l. en.,Geore ~Amendment?Asst. Atty. Gen., Lawrence G. Wallace, Dpty.
Sol. Gen., Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Asst. to Sol. Gen., Petition for certiorari filed 5/18/95, by H.
Mark B. Stern and Bruce G. Forrest, both Justice Bartow Farr III, Richard G. Taranto, Farr &
Dept. Attys., William E. Kennard, Federal Com- Taranto, Daniel L. Brenner, Neal M. Goldberg,
munications Commission Gen. Counsel, and and David L. Nicoll, all of Washington, D.C.
Christopher J. Wright, Dpty. Gen. Counsel.
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The CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY
OF VIRGINIA, et. al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
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OPINION
DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of 47
U.S.C. §533(b), which provides, in pertinent part:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier,
subject in whole or in part to subchapter II of this
chapter, to provide video programming directly to
subscribers in its telephone service area, either
directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned
by, operated by, controlled by, or under common
control with the common carrier.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier,
subject in whole or in part to subchapter II of this
chapter, to provide channels of communication or
pole line conduit space, or other rental
arrangements, to any entity which is directly or
indirectly owned by, operated by, controlled by,
or under common control with such common
carrier, if such facilities or arrangements are to be
used for, or in connection with, the provision of
video programming directly to subscribers in the
telephone service area of the common carrier.
This provision, enacted as part of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "1984 Cable
Act"), essentially prohibits local telephone companies
from offering, with editorial control, cable television
services to their common carrier subscribers. In a
thorough opinion, the district court found the statute
to violate the First Amendment. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm.
The facts and background underlying this case,
which the parties do not dispute, are presented fully in
the opinion of the district court. We summarize them
here.
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of
Virginia ("C & P") applied for a cable franchise from
the City of Alexandria ("City"). It is undisputed that
the City denied this application solely upon its belief
that any grant of such a franchise would violate 47
U.S.C. §533(b). Thereafter, C & P and Bell Atlantic
Video Systems, both wholly-owned subsidiaries of
Bell Atlantic Corporation, brought suit in federal
district court in Virginia against the United States, the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and
the Attorney General (collectively the "Government
defendants") seeking to invalidate Section 533(b) as
itself violative of the First Amendment and seeking to
enjoin its enforcement. Subsequently, the National
Cable Television Association ("NCTA") sought, and
was granted, permission to intervene as a defendant.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.
Ultimately, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment. It declared 47 U.S.C. §533(b)
unconstitutional both facially and as applied to
plaintiffs and enjoined the Government defendants
from enforcing the provision.
The Government defendants and the NCTA
appeal the district court's judgment.
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I.
III.
Much of the disagreement in this case arises from
one issue: the proper characterization of Section
533(b). Section 533(b) bars telephone companies
from directly or, via affiliates controlled by the
companies, indirectly distributing "video
programming" to customers of its common carrier
services. By regulation, the FCC defines "control" and
"affiliate" as follows: "[Tihe terms 'control' and
'affiliate' bar any financial or business relationship
whatsoever by contract or otherwise, directly or
indirectly between the carrier and the customer, except
only the carrier-user relationship." Further: "Only
those ownership interests which amount to 5 percent
or more shall be considered a cognizable ownership
'affiliation' for purposes of this section."
From the foregoing, we may distill the following
essential understanding of Section 533(b). Section
533(b) allows telephone companies to transmit,
without any editorial control, the video programming
of unaffiliated cable operators. Further, while
telephone companies can "create" video programming,
they cannot transmit directly their own programming
to their local subscribers. While appellants correctly
note that the telephone companies may legally arrange
to have their video programming transmitted to this
audience by means of unaffiliated cable or broadcast
television operators or by purchasing local broadcast
television stations, this argument ignores the practical
fact that this ability turns on the whim of local
broadcasters and cable operators. In short, while
telephone companies may legally arrange to have their
own video programming transmitted to their local
audiences, this does not mean that they can, in all
cases, achieve this goal. Thus, unlike other video
programmers, the telephone companies cannot
guarantee that their programming will reach this
audience. To this extent, then, Section 533(b)
regulates the telephone companies' ability to compete
in the video programming market, for a telephone
company which chooses to create its own video
programming cannot, unlike its competitors, ensure,
if it chooses, that its programming will reach any
particular audience.
We turn to an examination of how Section
533(b)'s function fulfills the goals which it was
enacted to serve. The need for regulation of the
telephone companies' entry into the cable medium
arises from the peculiar technological characteristics
of the cable medium. The Supreme Court explained
in Turner:
When an individual subscribes to cable, the
physical connection between the television set
and the cable network gives the cable operator
bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if
not all) of the television programming that is
channeled into the subscriber's home. Hence,
simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential
pathway for cable speech, a cable operator can
prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to
programming it chooses to exclude.
The telephone companies' common carrier networks
are the only electronic means of access to American
homes and businesses other than existing coaxial
cable wiring networks used by cable operators.
Recently, the possibility of transmitting cable
programming over these common carrier networks has
become a reality. Thus, the peculiar positioning of the
local telephone companies makes them natural
competitors of the cable operators.
Appellants advance two justifications for Section
533(b): preventing the telephone companies from
engaging in monopolistic practices against the cable
industry and maintaining diversity in ownership of
communications outlets. Although, at first glance, the
section appears to inhibit competition and undermine
diversity by effectively keeping the telephone
companies, the natural technological predators of the
cable companies, largely out of the cable business,
thereby allowing cable companies to keep their
monopolies, the reasoning behind Section 533(b) is
that, were telephone companies allowed to compete
directly against cable companies, the telephone
companies, by virtue of their monopoly position,
could and would drive the cable companies out of
business, resulting in telephone companies serving as
sole "gatekeeper[s]," of the means of electronic access
to homes and businesses. Worse, as explained more
fully below, the telephone companies could then use
this awesome power to exert monopoly control over
the market for video programming products, the
so-called video programming market.
IV.
"Video programming" comprises much of the
programming provided by cable television companies.
It is clear that the provision of cable television service
is a form of "speech" protected by the First
Amendment. Because Section 533(b) impairs the
telephone companies' ability to engage in a form of
protected speech, we must determine whether
Congress' enactment of Section 533(b) violated the
First Amendment.
A.
A court, in evaluating whether a regulation of
speech runs afoul of the First Amendment, must
subject the regulation to a degree of scrutiny
determined by the particular circumstances presented.
Generally, a regulation that imposes a differential
burden on certain speech because of the "content" of
that speech alleged to infringe upon protected speech
is unconstitutional unless it can survive strict scrutiny.
By contrast, "regulations that are unrelated to the
content of speech are subject to an intermediate level
of scrutiny." It is under this standard that the
government may "impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech"
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(so-called "time, place and manner restrictions"),
provided that the restrictions are content-neutral.
Last, in rare cases, the Supreme Court has held that
the First Amendment requires that certain regulations
of speech pass only minimal scrutiny.
2.
. . . Section 533(b) must survive some form of
heightened scrutiny if it is to be found constitutional.
The district court found that the regulation at issue in
this case should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny.
We agree, although our reasoning differs from that
advanced by the district court.
We will subject Section 533(b) to strict scrutiny
only if it regulates speech based upon content. "[Tihe
'principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality ...
is whether the govemment has adopted a regulation of
speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with
the message it conveys.' " Turner outlines a two-step
inquiry to be undertaken in determining whether a
regulation is content-neutral. First, we must examine
the plain terms of the regulation to see whether, on its
face, the regulation confers benefits or imposes
burdens based upon the content of the speech it
regulates. If the regulation's plain language does not,
itsel mandate a finding of content discrimination, we
then must determine whether, nevertheless there are
indications that the regulation's "manifest purpose is
to regulate speech because of the message it conveys."
We may discern a statute's manifest purpose from the
statute's stated purpose, or from its "design and
operation."
b.
That section 533(b) does not, on its face, "burden
or benefit speech of a particular content does not end
the inquiry,"; "a regulation neutral on its face may be
content-based if its manifest purpose is to regulate
speech because of the message it conveys."
The question of whether Section 533(b)
"produce[s a] net decrease in the amount of available
speech" requires closer attention. A regulation that, in
fact, decreases the amount of available speech may
operate as a content- based regulation because, by
limiting the amount of available speech, the likelihood
that some point of view or discussion on a particular
topic may not occur is enhanced. Along these lines,
the Turner Court reaffirmed that "[rlegulations that
discriminate among media, or among different
speakers within a single medium, often present serious
First Amendment concerns." The Court proceeded to
clarify that the First Amendment does not mandate
strict scrutiny "for any speech regulation that applies
to one medium (or a subset thereof) but not others."
. . Although common carriers are not members of
"the press" insofar as 47 U.S.C. §202 precludes them
from exercising editorial control over the
communications they transmit, the foregoing would
nevertheless seem applicable to Section 533(b), which
restricts a class of speakers from joining the press by
operating, with editorial control and within certain
areas, cable systems. Moreover, we see no reason why
a government regulation which discriminates against
a particular class of speakers behind which "there [is]
no evidence [of] an illicit governmental motive," but
which is "structured in a manner that raisels]
suspicions that [its] objective was, in fact, the
suppression of certain ideas," would not similarly be
subject to strict scrutiny.
Section 533(b) cannot be said to "target" a small
class of speakers; rather, Congress enacted Section
533(b) so as to preserve diversity of ownership of the
"bottleneck" of the means of electronic access into
homes and businesses. That Congress has determined
that this goal is achieved by regulating what turns out,
incidentally, to be a small class of speakers does not
evince congressional intent to "target" those speakers.
In short, while it is true that, because of the small
class of speakers it adversely affects, Section 533(b)
bears some "resembl[ance to] a penalty for particular
speakers or particular ideas," this apparent
resemblance is dispelled by the logical,
content-neutral explanation for Section 533(b)'s
regulation of this class.
Appellees further argue that the fact that Section
533(b) so severely limits the speech of such a small
class of speakers requires application of strict
scrutiny. We disagree. As just established, because
the identity and size of the speaker class here
adversely affected result solely from the peculiar
characteristics of the cable medium, such
considerations are not relevant to the
content-neutrality inquiry. Putting the size of the class
of regulated speakers aside, then, while Section
533(b)'s limitations on telephone companies' speech
may aptly be described as "severe," at least in some
ense of the word, we cannot say that the limitations
imposed are "likely to stifle the free exchange of
ideas." Section 533(b)'s operation is in no way
content-based. Consequently, the telephone
companies are free to engage in speech advancing any
view with respect to any topic. Indeed, they may even
transmit, with full editorial control, programming,
other than "video programming" over their own
common carrier networks. For these reasons, we
reject appellees' argument in this regard.
Accordingly, we will subject Section 533(b) to
intermediate scrutiny and see if it passes muster.
B.
To pass intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral
speech regulation must be "'narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest, and. . . leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the
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information.' " For ease of discussion, we isolate the
following prongs which must be satisfied for
constitutionality to be concluded: (1) the interests
which Section 533(b) purports to serve must be
"significant"; (2) Section 533(b) must be "narrowly
tailored" to serve those interests; and (3) Section
533(b) must "leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information" the
transmission of which Section 533(b) regulates. We
examine each of these prongs seriatim.
1.
As discussed above in Section III, dual goals
underlie Section 533(b): restricting telephone
company exercise of cross-subsidization and
pole-access discrimination (perhaps, now that
technology allows the telephone companies to transmit
video programming directly over their common carrier
lines, more aptly described as network-access
discrimination) in the cable medium, and preserving
diversity of ownership of communications outlets and
of the means of electronic access to homes and
businesses. To determine whether these interests are
"significant," we need not look beyond the Supreme
Court's opinion in Turner. First, with respect to the
restraint of unfair trade practices on the part of the
telephone companies, Justice Kennedy explained,
"[T]he government's interest in eliminating restraints
on fair competition is always substantial, even where
the individuals or entities subject to particular
regulations are engaged in expressive activity
protected by the First Amendment." Second, with
respect to diversity of ownership of communications
outlets, Justice Kennedy explained: "[A]ssuring that
the public has access to a multiplicity of information
sources is a governmental purpose of the highest
order, for it promotes values central to the First
Amendment." Also of great significance is the
government's interest in "ensur[ing] that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of [the]
critical ['bottleneck'] of [cable] communication, the
free flow of information and ideas."
interests Section 533(b) serves are "significant."
2.
For a remedy to be considered narrowly tailored,
it "need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive
means" of achieving the government's goal. "Rather,
the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so
long as the regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation."' However, a
regulation that "burden[s] substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests" is not narrowly tailored.
In determining whether a statute is narrowly
tailored, we generally "afford great weight to the
decisions of Congress and the experience of the
[FCC]." This deference is not without its bounds,
however. In the context of intermediate scrutiny, we
owe deference to the Congress only to the extent that
it makes factual findings regarding the need for the
particular measure enacted; "if there are numerous
and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the
restriction," we will not accede to Congress' judgment.
At this juncture, we assume, arguendo, (1) that
ordinary regulatory oversight is insufficient to guard
against telephone company use of cross- subsidization
in the cable transport market; and (2) that the
proffered explanation of how the possibility of
domination over the video programming market
provides an "irresistible" incentive to the telephone
companies to engage in unfair competition in the cable
transport market, without which they would not so act.
We therefore assume that the possibility that a
telephone company may engage in cross-subsidization
in the cable transport market presents a problem
which may properly demand congressional or
regulatory attention, and that the problem may
properly be addressed by regulation of the video
programming market. One problem with Section
533(b) remains: we are not convinced that Section
533(b)'s remedy is narrowly tailored to serve the goal
of ameliorating this problem.
The Congress did not buttress Section 533(b)
with any underlying factual findings. Even the
legislative history, to the extent that is relevant in this
regard, offers only a broad statement about preserving
diversity of ownership of communications outlets.
While the FCC's development of the rule that
preceded Section 533(b) is more fully documented,
and while we may presume that Congress relied, at
least to some degree, thereon, we note that the FCC's
reasoning does not indicate that attention was devoted
to the possibility of other, less drastic regulatory
schemes that might achieve the substantial
government interests enunciated above. Further,
perhaps because the FCC's motivation for enacting the
regulatory precursor to Section 533(b) was the threat
to the cable transport market that telephone company
engagement in pole-access discrimination and
cross-subsidization posed, the FCC's
contemporaneous discussions of its rule do not even
hint at the complex of incentives and evils, outlined
above, involving the cable transport and video
programming markets.
Moreover, we agree with the district court that an
"obvious less-burdensome alternative[ ]" to Section
533(b) readily presents itself (and indeed has been
identified by the FCC as a possible alternative to
Section 533(b) in its recommendation to Congress to
repeal the provision): Congress could simply limit the
telephone companies' editorial control over video
programming to a fixed percentage of the channels
available; the telephone companies would be required
to lease the balance of the channels on a common
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carrier basis to various video programmers, without which, in his opinion, is unnecessary to the decision
regard to content. herein.
At bottom, we conclude that Section 533(b) is not AFFIRMED.
narrowly tailored because the government has failed to
demonstrate why Section 533(b) does not, by
removing the "irresistible" incentive which domination MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
of that market provides, "burden substantially more concurring in thejudgment: [Omitted.]
speech than is necessary,"
C.
Having concluded that Section 533(b) is not
"narrowly tailored" to serve the goals to which it is
dedicated, we must find that the provision has not
been able to withstand intermediate scrutiny. That
Section 533(b) is not "narrowly tailored" is not its
only infirmity to intermediate scrutiny, however; the
provision also does not leave the telephone companies
with ample alternative channels for communication.
Whether a regulation leaves open ample
alternative methods of communication is more than an
inquiry as to whether the regulation "completely
silences" the speaker. Rather, for a regulation to be
constitutional, the ample alternative methods of
communication must be sufficiently similar to the
method foreclosed by the regulation.
Section 533(b) does not meet this requirement.
The statute bars absolutely the telephone companies
from entering, with editorial discretion, the cable
television market. Appellants argue that the telephone
companies have numerous alternative avenues of
communication open to them: they may "arrange" to
have programming of their choice transmitted to their
common carrier subscribers by unaffiliated cable
systems or broadcast stations or newspapers. While
this may in general be true, the fact remains that the
telephone companies cannot guarantee that video
programming they wish to transmit to their local
audience via cable television, a protected form of
speech, will reach their desired audience. Appellants'
accurate observation that the telephone companies
may own cable systems in areas outside their areas of
commonJUA carier4 sevic does nollt Uadress the~ problem.
that the telephone companies remain unable to reach
the audience of their common carrier subscribers
should they so choose. While the First Amendment
may tolerate speech regulations that "ban [a]
particular manner or type of expression at a given time
or place," it does not accommodate regulations which
ban completely a particular manner of expression. We
conclude, therefore, that Section 533(b) does not
afford the telephone companies "ample alternative
channels for communication of the information" the
transmission of which Section 533(b) regulates.
V.
Judge Tilley and Judge Russell concur in the
foregoing opinion; Judge Michael concurs in the
judgment herein. Judge Michael, however, dissents
from the inclusion in the opinion of Section IV.A.2.,
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HIGH COURT WILL DECIDE IF PHONE FIRMS CAN CARRY TV
Los Angeles Times
Copyright, Los Angeles Times 1995
Tuesday, June 27, 1995
David G. Savage
Times Staff Writer
With the telecommunications world in
a legal flux, the Supreme Court announced
Monday it would rule on whether phone
companies have a free-speech right to
deliver television signals over their wires.
If the answer is "yes," local telephone
companies could become powerful players
in the TV business, because they have both
lines running to every home and enough
money to expand into a new type of
service.
For just that reason, Clinton
Administration lawyers have opposed
allowing phone companies to enter the
business of transmitting video
programming. Local phone companies
could use their "monopoly profits" to
subsidize expansion into TV transmission
and drive out the local cable companies,
U.S. Solicitor General Drew S. Days III
told the court.
But lawyers for the phone companies
say the increased competition would
benefit consumers and drive down rates for
receiving TV signals. They note that local
cable companies now enjoy a monopoly in
their areas.
While the constitutional issue is
intriguing and the practical stakes
profound, it is unclear whether the high
court will finally decide the case. That is
because Congress is working on a new law
to deregulate nearly all aspects of the
telecommunications industry. Both the
House and Senate versions of the bill
would repeal the law that prohibits a
telephone company from providing video
programming to its customers. The Senate
has approved those changes, while the
House bill has been passed by committee
and is awaiting floor action.
Despite the pending legislation, the
justices apparently believed they had no
choice but to hear the government's appeal
in the case of U.S. vs. Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co.
The company already has won rulings
from a federal judge in Alexandria, Va.,
and the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
in Richmond striking down the federal law
as unconstitutional and declaring the phone
company has a free-speech right to transmit
TV signals.
The justices said they will hear
arguments in the case during the fall.
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HIGH COURT TO CONSIDER REINSTATEMENT OF BAN ON
BABY BELLS' CABLE OPERATIONS
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Tuesday, June 27, 1995
Paul M. Barrett
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
Washington - The Supreme Court agreed to consider
reinstatement of a law banning local telephone
companies from offering video programming to
customers in their service areas.
A federal appeals court in Richmond, Va., last
year struck down the ban on First Amendment
free-speech grounds in a case involving Bell Atlantic
Corp. Other lower federal courts have issued similar
rulings.
The Justice Department asked the Supreme Court
to set aside the Richmond court's ruling and reinstate
the 1984 law, which was intended to prevent the seven
regional Baby Bells and other local phone companies
from dominating cable markets. The Justice
Department contended in its brief that lower courts
have exaggerated the degree of free-speech restrictions
on phone companies and that Congress should have
broad authority to regulate which companies can get
into the cable business.
In fact, the Supreme Court case could get eclipsed
by activity in Congress. The Senate earlier this month
passed legislation that would repeal the ban on phone
companies getting into cable, as part of a much larger
push to deregulate the nation's telecommunications
system. The House is expected to move in coming
months on a somewhat different version of the
deregulation bill, which also contains a provision
repealing the cross-ownership prohibition.
But while the House is expected to approve a bill,
it's possible that partisan jousting could bog down
efforts to work out a compromise version with the
Senate. The Clinton administration has warned
against what it views as excessive deregulation, and
the president's final position will depend in part on the
details of what Congress produces.
If a repeal of the cross-ownership ban on phone
companies is enacted, it would make the Supreme
Court case moot. But if the legislative process doesn't
produce a bill, the high court's ruling could be critical
to phone companies that want to expand into video
services. The justices probably won't hear oral
arguments in the case until December, with a decision
in 1996.
Even though Bell Atlantic and other phone
companies have been successful in their lower-court
attacks on the ban, Bell Atlantic took the unusual step
of asking the Supreme Court to take the case.
Philadelphia-based Bell Atlantic said that before
billions of dollars are invested in building an
"information superhighway" linking computers,
phones and video providers, the Supreme Court
should assure the phone companies that they have
protection under the First Amendment to branch out
into new fields.
Phone industry officials yesterday applauded the
high court's accepting the case. "Risk hangs over
everyone's business plans," and if Congress ultimately
fails to act, the justices could eliminate some of that
uncertainty, said Mary McDermott, vice president for
legal and regulatory matters at the U.S. Telephone
Association here in Washington. The association
represents the Baby Bells and hundreds of other local
phone firms.
The Justice Department, in its appeal to the
Supreme Court, had suggested that the justices set
aside the Richmond court's ruling and send the case
back to the lower court for further consideration of a
newly announced Federal Communications
Commission procedure. Under the new administrative
process, the FCC said it would ordinarily grant
exceptions to the ban, providing added flexibility so
that the 1984 law didn't have to be struck down by the
courts.
But Bell Atlantic had opposed this approach,
expressing .deep skepticism about leaving the FCC
with administrative power to veto phone-company
plans to move into video programming. In something
of a rebuff to the Justice Department, the high court
decided to review the case itself, rather than sending
it back to the lower court.
Ms. McDermott said the phone industry viewed
the Justice Department's emphasis on the FCC
administrative procedure as "a litigation tactic to
avoid having the case finally decided." Sending the
case back to the appeals court in Richmond would
have caused delays and additional confusion, she
added.
The appeals-court ruling last year upheld a federal
trial judge's determination that, under the First
Amendment, the cross-ownership restriction wasn't
"narrowly tailored" enough to serve the government's
purpose of promoting competition in video
programming. Congress passed the ban out of concern
that the Baby Bells would gain an unfair advantage by
subsidizing video operations from the proceeds of
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their monopoly local phone operations. Another
congressional worry was that the Bells would
discriminate against video competitors by locking
them out of phone-company transmission facilities.
The Richmond appeals court said these potential
dangers could be addressed by banning
anticompetitive practices, rather than keeping the
phone companies out of video altogether. (U.S. vs.
Bell Atlantic Corp.)
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HIGH COURT WILL RULE IN BELL ATLANTIC CASE
Appeals Court Upheld Ruling Against Ban on Phone-Cable Ventures
Richmond Times-Dispatch
Copyright 1995
Tuesday, June 27, 1995
From staff and wire reports
The U.S. Supreme Court will review a Virginia
case to decide whether local telephone companies may
enter the cable television business in their service
areas and sell programming directly to their
customers.
The court said yesterday it would review an
appeals court ruling that allows Bell Atlantic Corp. to
sell video programming in its Virginia telephone
territory and other parts of the mid-Atlantic. A federal
judge in Alexandria struck down a federal prohibition
against such ventures, and he was upheld last fall by
the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond.
Nontheless, Bell Atlantic said it wanted the high
court to review the case to end the debate and make
clear that the company could enter the video business
in its telephone territory.
"We're perfectly confident that the Supreme Court
is going to rule as other federal courts have ruled,"
said Bell Atlantic spokesman Eric W. Rabe. "It seems
frankly like an open-and-shut case."
The Department of Justice and the cable
television industry had appealed the 4th Circuit
decision, asking the Supreme Court to send the case
back to the lower courts for further review. They
argued that the earlier decisions did not consider the
newly acquired power of federal regulators to allow
telephone companies into video programming on a
case-by-case basis.
Yesterday's decision could become meaningless.
The high court's ruling is not expected until sometime
next year, and Congress may have decided the issue
by then.
The Senate earlier this month approved a bill that,
among other things, would let local telephone
companies enter the cable business. The House is
expected to consider a similar bill next month.
Bell Atlantic hasn't waited for the political or
judicial processes to end. It is conducting a market
trial of "video-on-demand" services to consumers in
Fairfax, plans to roll out an interactive video network
in New Jersey by fall, and is hoping to offer the
services commercially in six major markets by early
1997. The initial markets include Northern Virginia
and Hampton Roads.
The Philadelphia-based company began its legal
challenge in 1992, when its Virginia telephone
company and video services subsidiary filed suit in
U.S. District Court in Alexandria. They contended
that the 1984 federal ban was an unconstitutional
violation of their free-speech rights.
The 1984 law is similar to one that prohibits local
television stations from owning cable systems in their
service areas. The law does not prohibit telephone
companies from selling video programming outside of
their territories.
Government lawyers say the ban is intended to
prevent anti-competitive practices in the cable
industry.
In its ruling in November, the 4th Circuit appeals
court said the ban burdens "substantially more speech
than is necessary."
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94-1140 44 LIQUORMART INC. v. RHODE
ISLAND
State restrictions on price advertising-First
Amendment.
Ruling below (CA 1, 39 F.3d 5, 22 MedLRptr
2409):
Rhode Island laws that forbid liquor price
advertising except at point of sale do not violate
First Amendment.
Question presented: May Rhode Island, consis-
tent with First Amendment, prohibit truthful,
non-misleading price advertising regarding alco-
holic beverages?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/27/94, by Evan
T. Lawson, and Lawson & Weitzen, both of
Boston, Mass.
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44 LIQUORMART, INC. and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc., Plaintiffs,
Appellees,
V.
STATE of RHODE ISLAND, Defendant, Appellee,
Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association, Intervenor, Appellant.
44 LIQUORMART, INC. and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc., Plaintiffs,
Appellees,
V.
STATE of RHODE ISLAND, Defendant, Appellant.
Nos. 93-1893, 93-1927
39 F.3d 5
United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.
Heard Feb. 10, 1994.
Decided Oct. 24, 1994.
ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge.
The State of Rhode Island, that did not ratify the
Eighteenth Amendment, and was among the earliest to
ratify the Twenty-First that repealed it, in 1956
adopted two statutes, assertedly aimed at promoting
temperance, forbidding advertising the price of
intoxicating liquor, except at the place of sale if sold
within the state. The "declared purpose is the
promotion of temperance and for the reasonable
control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages."
R.I.Gen.Laws §3-8-7 provides,
3-8-7. Advertising price of malt beverages,
cordials, wine or distilled liquor.--No
manufacturer, wholesaler, or shipper from
without this state and no holder of a license
issued under the provisions of this title and
chapter shall cause or permit the advertising in
any manner whatsoever of the price of any malt
beverage, cordials, wine or distilled liquor offered
for sale in this state; provided, however, that the
provisions of this section shall not apply to price
signs or tags attached to or placed on
merchandise for sale within the licensed premises
in accordance with rules and regulations of the
department.
In this action plaintiffs, 44 Liquormart, Inc. and
Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc., having sufficient
standing to attack these statutes in every particular,
seek a declaration against the Administrator
(hereinafter the State) of unconstitutionality as
contravening the First Amendment. Rhode Island
Liquor Stores Association (Association) has
intervened as a party defendant. After a bench trial, in
an extensive opinion the court found for plaintiffs.
Defendants appeal. They succeed with respect to
limiting advertising by Rhode Island vendors.
The stage it set below is described by the State.
[Tihe advertising ban directly advanced the
governmental interest by increasing the cost of
alcoholic beverages, thereby lowering the amount of
alcohol consumption by residents of the State of
Rhode Island.... [T]he State's power to totally ban
any advertising about alcoholic beverages necessarily
included the lesser power to restrict price advertising.
Further, the State contended that plaintiffs, in order to
rely on the First Amendment, must "prove that the
four part Central Hudson test could not be met."
Association, a group of small liquor stores, whose
intervention as a co-defendant was not opposed by the
State, alleged as its ground for intervening that if
advertising of prices were to be allowed, its members
"would be obliged to participate in the advertising
arena and would be at a definite disadvantage when
matched up against retailers who hold multiple
licenses." This complaint was later bolstered by
adding that competitive price advertising would tend
to lower prices, and that "a more competitive market
for alcohol might be considered an undesirable goal."
We start with the four issues that Central Hudson
raises when a state's interest conflicts with the rights
of a would-be commercial speaker.
At the outset, we must determine whether the
expression is protected by the First Amendment.
[I] For commercial speech to come within that
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provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. [Il] Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine [III] whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and
[IV] whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
In the present case the first test raises no question.
For the second it was stipulated, "The State of Rhode
Island has a substantial interest in regulating the sale
of alcoholic beverages." Plaintiffs concede that
promoting temperance is such an interest. The
dispute, accordingly, is whether forbidding price
advertising "directly advances" temperance, and "is
not more extensive than is necessary." There is a
further question with regard to local advertising by an
out-of-state vendor.
"Directly advances." We start with the burden of
proof The burden is on the party seeking
suppression, here the State. But to what extent? The
district court held that it was an issue for it to decide,
unfettered, between competing witnesses, and since,
on its weighing the evidence, the court was not
persuaded that the State was correct, it failed. We do
not think the burden that strict. It is not correctness,
it is reasonableness.
In the first place, the term "directly advances" is
not absolute. And while the state has the burden, in
California v. LaRue, the Court spoke of "the added
presumption in favor of the validity of the state
regulation in this area that the Twenty- First
Amendment requires." Historically the state has failed
where the evidence was "at most, tenuous,"
"unsupported assertions: nowhere does the State cite
any evidence or authority of any kind," lack of studies
or "anecdotal evidence." Warrantable inferences,
however, may be sufficient. What should a court do
when there is no empirical evidence either way, and
expert opinions go both ways? Even plaintiffs' expert,
whom the court credited, admitted that "advertising
has cumulative effects that are difficult to detect in
studies, and that research studies have been varied and
equivocal because it is a difficult topic to research."
Should the court be free to choose?
Before answering these questions we observe
that the "not more extensive than is necessary" inquiry
is subject to the same considerations. The district
court did not deal with this directly, except to note the
concession of the State's expert that "the objective of
lowering consumption of alcohol by banning price
advertising could be accomplished by establishing
minimum prices and/or by increasing sales taxes on
alcoholic beverages." This is not an answer; the State
is entitled to a reasonable choice. This includes
choice of method--it is not obliged to prove that some
other method, e.g., taxation, would be less effective.
Returning to our questions, there would seem
inherent merit in the State's contention that
competitive price advertising would lower prices, and
that with lower prices there would be more sales. We
would enlarge on this. There are doubtless many
buyers whose consumption is sometimes measured by
their free money. If a buyer learns that plaintiffs
charge less, is he not likely to go there, and then buy
more? Correspondingly, if ignorant of lower prices
elsewhere, will he not tend to buy locally, at the higher
price, and thus buy less? Further, if Association
members would fight plaintiffs' advertised prices, as
they presage, by lowering their own, then, again,
might there not be more buys?
Even plaintiffs' witness Smart conceded that some
believed this inference reasonable. What I'm aware of
are studies that show that people generally decide how
much money they have to spend on alcoholic
beverages per week or per month. Then they tend to
spend that amount, and if they can spend it in one
way, they'll do it and in another way they'll do that as
well. Advertising must be generally productive, or so
much money would not be spent on it. We do not
consider, in the absence of any affirmative
contradiction to rely on, that the district court was free
to hold it unreasonable. In addition, the presumption
based upon the Twenty-First Amendment, seems
precisely in order.
The Ohio court, recognizing that commercial
speech was entitled to some protection, pursued the
four Central Hudson tests and found that the statute
was "not unreasonable" in light of the Twenty-First
Amendment's authorization to curb the evils of
alcoholic beverages. It concluded as follows. The
regulation is directed toward regulation of the
intoxicants themselves, rather than speech. This is
unlike the case, where the speech was the actual focus
of the regulation, since the aim of the restriction was
the prevention of competition in pharmaceutical sales,
not the discouragement of pharmaceutical purchases.
Reliance on Queensgate as conclusive, however,
might raise possible questions. The first is whether
the Court would have said there was no federal
question if free speech had been curtailed by a
regulation clearly unrelated to liquor. We need not
answer this because we have found that the State's
action was reasonable as a control. But suppose the
primary purpose was that eliminated by the
Queensgate court? On the issue of purpose the State
is not helped by its friends. Association's given reason
for wanting to intervene as a defendant, that the statute
protects the small vendor from the giants, could make
logical sense, but might not be a lawful use of the
Twenty-First Amendment. We need not resolve this
question either, however. There is a burden to rebut
the statutes' declared purpose, and plaintiffs have
made no attempt. We conclude therefore that, with
Queensgate or without, plaintiff 44 Liquormart must
lose.
$44
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Peoples Super Liquor Stores, a Massachusetts
vendor that wishes to advertise its Massachusetts
prices in Rhode Island, has a different case. Because
of R.I.Gen .Laws §3-8-8.1 no Rhode Island publisher
will accept advertisements.
Price advertising by media or advertising
companies unlawful.-No newspaper, periodical, radio
or television broadcaster or broadcasting company or
any other person, firm or corporation with a principal
place of business in the state of Rhode Island which is
engaged in the business of advertising or selling
advertising time or space shall accept, publish, or
broadcast any advertisement in this state of the price
or make reference to the price of any alcoholic
beverages. . ..
By the hypothesis under which we are justifying
forbidding price advertising by local vendors, State
residents, whose shopping opportunity is thus
curtailed, will be more likely to purchase at
higher-priced neighborhood outlets and less at
lower-priced, viz., discount sellers elsewhere. Insofar
as this constriction is aimed at foreign sellers, it is a
deliberate, and, by hypothesis effective, discrimination
and restraint on interstate commerce. Thus we have
two questions. One, is the State's interest in health and
welfare sufficient to overcome the foreign vendors'
right of free speech? Two, if so, are the rights given
the State by the Twenty First Amendment sufficient to
meet the foreign vendors' further objections under the
Commerce Clause?
Viewed simply as free speech, if a party wishes to
come into a state and do business, to some extent, at
least, it should be subject to the same regulations as
are its local counterparts. While the question may be
close, where we are dealing simply with commercial
speech, whose rights are limited, we believe the State
health interest, as reinforced by the Twenty First
Amendment, should empower the State to restrict
foreigners as well. Nor do we find support for the
contrary in the Bigelow opinion. We read the
language relied on by Peoples Super Liquor Stores in
the light of the fact that the advertisement contained
more than commercial speech. Here we have no more
than commercial.
The serious question is whether the Twenty First
Amendment can prevail against the Commerce Clause
when the State is deliberately favoring local vendors
against foreign enterprise. The full meaning and effect
of this Amendment has been much debated. At a
minimum it does not do away altogether with the
Commerce Clause. But, as a matter of dictum, the
Court in has recognized the possibility that a state
might discriminate "to promote temperance or to carry
out any other purpose of the Twenty First
Amendment." We have tentatively explored this
question in some depth, and find it difficult.
This raises a problem. The record shows that,
initially, Peoples included the Commerce Clause in its
contentions. On appeal, it dropped it. While at first
we thought that the two principles were so tied
together that we should nevertheless consider it, we
have concluded that fairness to the State, and, indeed
to us, requires that we do not do so without full
briefing and argument. Accordingly, we apply the
general principle and hold the Commerce Clause
waived. Since without it Peoples must fail, the
decision below is reversed, with judgment for
defendants.
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BEER ADS ON BUSES DECLARED ILLEGAL
The State Liquor Control Administrator, Who Made the Ruling, Says the Ads
Will Be Removed from RIPTA Buses
The Providence Journal-Bulletin
Copyright 1995
Tuesday, June 27, 1995
Robert Kramer
The discount-beer ads that have been rolling
around Rhode Island recently on the sides of state-run
buses were declared illegal yesterday by Joseph E.
Gallucci, the state liquor control administrator, who
said he had been assured that they would be removed
over the next few days.
State law prohibits advertising the prices of
alcoholic beverages "in any manner whatsoever." In
the ads, Coors Brewing Co. offers 30-can cases of
beer for the price of 24-can cases - a 20 percent
discount.
The ads have been on the sides of 30 buses run by
the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority since
April 1. The three-month ad contract will expire
Friday, according to William Meara of Transportation
Display Inc., who handles the RIPTA account.
Galluccisaid that he called William Trevitt,
RIPTA general manager, yesterday to tell him the ads
were illegal. Trevitt then contacted Transportation
Display Inc. "The agency called here," Gallucci said.
"They've agreed to remove the placards from the side
of the buses. In the next day or two, as the buses come
in, they will remove them."
The state law provides for fines in case of
violations, but Gallucci said he does not levy fines as
long as the violator agrees to remove the illegal signs.
Meara said Friday that he knew about the state
law banning price advertising for alcoholic beverages,
and that he had "no opinion" about whether the Coors
ad violates the law.
"I don't have the right to think what the ad says,"
Meara said. "As long as it meets the guidelines set by
the Transit Authority, then I have to put it up."
This year, $350,000 in advertising revenue was
budgeted by RIPTA, about 1 percent of total revenue.
The 1956 law banning advertising is on appeal
before the U.S. Supreme Court. It is expected to be
argued before the court in the fall by Rebecca T.
Partington, a special assistant attorney general who
has handled the case for the state from the beginning.
Law was ruled unconstitutional
In 1993, Senior U.S. District Judge Raymond J.
Pettine declared the law to be an unconstitutional
infringement on freedom of commercial speech, as
provided for by the First Amendment. He said that the
state could not prohibit the advertising of prices of
alcoholic beverages unless that ban "directly
advances" temperance.
"Promoting temperance" is the stated overall goal
of liquor control statutes in Rhode Island. After
viewing the videotaped testimony of three experts in
the case, Pettine concluded that there was little or no
link between the advertising of the prices of alcoholic
beverages and the extent of their consumption.
A month after Pettine's decision, an appeal was
filed by Atty. Gen. Jeffrey B. Pine and the Rhode
Island Liquor Stores Association, the retailers' trade
association. The original defendant was the liquor
control administrator, whose office is part of the state
Department of Business Regulation.
But despite being
department's director
Whitehouse, declined to
why.
lobbied to appeal, the
at the time, Sheldon
do so, and would not say
Pine's office went ahead with the appeal,
according to a spokesman, because the case has
precedent-setting implications for state controls on
advertising of other commodities, such as tobacco.
But Whitehouse suggested an additional
explanation for Pine's involvement: "The attorney
general elected to join in the appeal because the [retail
association] . . . had no standing otherwise. That at
least will get the issue heard" by the appellate court.
Last year, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
issued three separate rulings, which ended in reversing
Pettine's decision and reinstating the ad ban.
The plaintiffs now challenging the Rhode Island
ban are People's Super Liquor Stores, a three-store
chain doing business as People's Discount Liquor in
New Bedford and Fairhaven, Mass., and 44
LiquorMart, which does business as 44 Liquors in
Johnston. They have appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, and have been granted a hearing.
States generally have the right to control
commerce in alcohol, under the 21st Amendment,
which repealed Prohibition and passed that federal
power to the states. But Rhode Island remains only
one of a handful of states that have banned the
advertising of liquor prices.
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HIGH COURT GETS R.I. PRICE BAN IN LIQUOR ADS
Providence Journal-Bulletin
Copyright Providence Journal Co. 1995
Tuesday, May 2, 1995
Gregory Smith
Providence, RI,-How much does it cost for a six-pack
of Budweiser beer or a bottle of Johnny Walker Black
Label Scotch whisky? Right now, a Rhode Island state
law forces consumers to go into a liquor store to find
out.
But the U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
decide whether states may ban price advertising for
liquor. Rhode Island is one of the few that do. The
justices said they will review a free-speech challenge
to Rhode Island's ban, enforced since 1956 as an
attempt to reduce consumption of alcoholic beverages.
"We finally reached the end of the rod," crowed
North Providence businessman John Haronian, who is
one of two liquor store proprietors who brought the
question to the Supreme Court.
"It's got to be a feather in our cap" to get the
attention of the top court, he said. The justices, who
agree to hear only a small percentage of the disputes
brought to them, are hearing the Rhode Island case
"because they consider it to present real serious issues,
issues that the court is interested in resolving," said
Haronian's lawyer, Evan Lawson.
The 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Rhode Island ban last year, ruling that it is a
constitutionally permissible limitation on commercial
speech.
Yesterday's action follows by two weeks a high
court decision that struck down a federal law that
banned brewers from putting alcohol-content
information on the labels of beer cans and bottles.
The court said the 1935 federal law, aimed at
preventine "strength wars" amone beer manufacturers.
violated free-speech rights.
Rhode Island law allows advertising for alcoholic
beverages, but requires publishers and broadcasters to
exclude any mention of prices, or even the word
"sale." A store may not post prices that are readily
visible from the street. Massachusetts has no such
ban.
The price ban is being attacked by 44 Liquormart
Inc., of Johnston, and by People's Super Liquor Stores
Inc., which Haronian owns and which sells liquor to
Rhode Island residents from its two Massachusetts
stores in New Bedford and Fairhaven.
"I truly believe that what I'm doing is right,"
Haronian said of his crusade. "The consumers should
know what they're going to pay before they go into the
store"'
Haronian said his research shows that there is no
connection between the advertising of prices of
alcoholic beverages and the amount of consumption.
Haronian, who owns the Vision World chain of
eyecare centers and owned the former Douglas Drug
phain, has changed the course of state regulation
before. In the 1970s, he won a legal fight to force the
state to allow advertising of prices of eyeglasses and
contact lenses.
James Spevock, of Sharon, Mass., who owns 44
Liquormart, is vice president of operations for
Haronian's businesses. Haronian, who lives in North
Providence, owns a holding company, Tri-State
Management Leasing Co., also of North Providence.
Tri-State manages Vision World and owns real estate
and a retirement village, The Lakes Adult Resort
Community, near Waterman Lake in Smithfield. His
daughter, Kathleen Haronian, owns Douglas Liquor in
North Providence.
The advertising prohibition was challenged after
44 Liquormart was fined $400 in 1991 for using the
word "wow" in an advertisement for its store that was
published in the Providence Journal-Bulletin. The
state liquor control administrator said the ad implied
a price.
Senior U.S. District Judge Raymond J. Pettine
ruled that the ban violated free-speech rights, but the
1st Circuit court reversed that ruling.
The appeals court relied heavily on a 1980
Supreme Court decision that set up a standard for
judging the constitutionality of limits on commercial
speech, which has less protection than noncommercial
forms of expression.
The 1980 decision said commercial speech that is
not misleading and concerns a legal activity may be
limited only if government has a substantial interest,
the limitation directly advances that interest, and it is
not more extensive than necessary.
The appeals court said the liquor regulatory
authority granted to the states by the Constitution's
21st Amendment, which ended Prohibition, adds to
the 1982 standard a "presumption in favor of the
validity of the state regulation in this area."
In the appeal acted on yesterday, lawyers for 44
Liquormart and People's argued that the 1st Circuit
court's ruling lets Rhode Island use the 21st
Amendment to topple First Amendment rights. The
Constitution's First Amendment guarantees freedom of
speech.
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"Rhode Island is attempting to ban speech that
Occurs off the licensed premises, and does no more
than convey helpful, accurate information about a
lawful product," the appeal said.
The appeal also contended that the state's
interest--curbing alcoholic consumption--isn't served
by the ban on price advertising. "Indeed, per capita
consumption in Rhode Island is higher than in some
states that permit price advertising," the justices were
told.
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JUSTICES TO DECIDE IF STATES MAY BAN LIQUOR-PRICE ADS
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Tuesday, May 2, 1995
Paul M. Barrett
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
Washington -- The Supreme Court
agreed to decide whether states may ban
the advertising of retail liquor prices.
The justices will consider a First
Amendment free-speech challenge to
Rhode Island's 40-year-old prohibition
on liquor ads that contain prices. Rhode
Island, which says the ban is meant to cut
consumption of alcohol, allows general
advertising of liquor.
The price ban was attacked in federal
court by liquor store operators from
Rhode Island and Massachusetts. At least
10 other states have enacted similar
restrictions on alcohol advertising,
according to the Association of National
Advertisers, a trade group that filed a
brief with the Supreme Court supporting
the challenge.
Just two weeks ago, in a separate
free-speech case involving alcoholic
beverages, the Supreme Court struck
down a federal law banning brewers from
putting alcohol content on beer labels.
The 60-year-old labeling law was
designed to prevent brewers from
engaging in alcohol "strength wars" to
entice customers - a purpose that the
high court concluded wasn't actually
served by the federal rule. That decision,
which involved a challenge by Adolph
Coors Co., won't necessarily determine
-I- _,.I T~L . ._ 1U _
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it doesn't bode well for the state's rule
against liquor price ads.
The high court will hear oral
arguments in the Rhode Island case next
fall and issue a decision by the summer of
1996.
The justices will review a ruling last
year by the federal appeals court in
Boston that said that Rhode Island could
prohibit any reference to liquor price
outside of licensed store premises. Rhode
Island justified the ban as an indirect way
of propping up liquor prices and thereby
discouraging people from drinking.
A federal trial court had struck down
the ban, but the appeals court in Boston
reversed that decision. The appeals court
said that Rhode Island's law enjoyed an
"added presumption in favor of . . .
validity" under the 21st Amendment,
which repealed Prohibition and gave
states the authority to regulate the liquor
business.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court,
the plaintiff store operators noted that
lower courts have issued conflicting
rulings on the interplay between the 21st
Amendment and the First Amendment's
free-speech guarantee. Rhode Island, the
challengers contended, is banning
communication that "does no more than
convey helpful, accurate information
about a lawful product." (44 Liquormart
Inc. vs. Rhode Island)
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94-1654 HEISER v. UMBEHR
Retaliatory termination- First Amendment.
Ruling below (Umbehr v. McClure, CA 10, 44
F.3d 876, 63 LW 2424):
Independent contractor's claim that county ter-
minated contract in retaliation for contractor's
speech on matter of public concern is actionable
under First Amendment, but county officials en-
joy qualified immunity from suit for damages on
that basis.
Questions presented: (1) Should remedies ar-
ticulated in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968), and its progeny be extended and
amplified to protect economic rights of govern-
ment contractors whose services are terminable at
will? (2) How are tests of Pickering and its
progeny to be reformulated or redescribed to fit
circumstances of independent contractor, if rule
of Pickering is to be extended? (3) If independent
contractors are to be given same protections as
employees under Pickering, will affirmative de-
fenses available to employers remain available to
contracting agency?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/3/95, by Donald
Patterson, and Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith
L.L.P., both of Topeka, Kan.
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Keen A. UMBEHR, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Joe McCLURE, Glen Heiser, and George Spencer, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 94-3022
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
44 F.3d 876
Jan. 4, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1995.
STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff and appellant Keen A. Umbehr appeals
the district court's grant of summary judgment to
Defendants, members or ex-members of the
Wabaunsee County Commission, on his 42 U.S.C.
§1983 action alleging that Defendants terminated a
trash hauling contract in retaliation for Mr. Umbehr's
exercise of his right to free speech. For the following
reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Umbehr hauled trash for six of the seven
cities in the county from 1985 until the county
terminated the contract in 1991. In other words, the
contract was automatically renewed each year,
according to its terms. Throughout this time period,
Mr. Umbehr spoke out at county commission meetings
and wrote letters and columns in local newspapers
about a variety of topics, including landfill user rates,
the cost of obtaining county documents from the
county, alleged violations by the county commission of
the Kansas Open Meetings Act, and a number of
alleged improprieties, including mismanagement of
taxpayer money, by the county road and bridge
department.
Mr. Umbehr brought suit against Defendants,
claiming that they caused the termination of his
contract with the county in retaliation for his
outspoken criticism of the county and the county
commission, thereby violating his First Amendment
right of free speech. . . Defendants filed motions for
summary judgment The district court assumed, solely
for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr
"would have been protected from termination in
retaliation for his statements" had he been a
government employee, that his "comments did
motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr.
Umbehr's] contract with Wabaunsee County," and that
he suffered damages as a result of the termination. It
then granted Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the ground that "the First Amendment
does not prohibit defendants from considering
plaintiffs expression as a factor in deciding not to
continue with the trash hauling contract at the end of
the contract's annual term." The court expressly
declined to rule on Defendants' claim that their actions
were protected by legislative immunity, but held,
alternatively, that Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity from damages for their actions.
Finally, the district court held that Mr. McClure was
additionally entitled to summary judgment because
there was "insufficient evidence which proves that
defendant McClure caused the termination of the
contract."
DISCUSSION
Mr. Umbehr was indisputably an independent
contractor. As the district court acknowledged, there
is conflicting case law on whether those who
independently contract with the government share the
same degree of First Amendment protection for their
speech as government employees. A number of
courts have held that governments may award or
terminate public contracts on the basis of political
affiliation or support.
Our own circuit has suggested, without analysis,
that independent contractors do enjoy protection
against retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment
rights.
Other circuits have provided a more detailed
analysis of the issue, in reaching the opposite
conclusion. The Seventh Circuit in LaFalce and the
Third Circuit in Horn provided the clearest
explanation of the reasoning behind those decisions
holding that independent contractors enjoy no First
Amendment protection when their contracts are
terminated or they do not receive government
contracts because of their exercise of First Amendment
rights. Two broad rationales animated those
decisions: (1) the history and legal treatment of
patronage practices in government employment; and
(2) perceived distinctions between the economic status
and interests of independent contractors and
employees. We examine each in turn.
Thus, of the two broad rationales behind Horn
and LaFalce--that the Supreme Court has restricted
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patronage practices sparingly and only in connection
with employees, and that independent contractors have
a different economic status vis-a-vis the government
than do employees-the first one arguably supports the
decisions permitting the award or termination of
public contracts on the basis of political affiliation.
The question remains whether it supports the
termination of government contracts in retaliation for
speech on matters of public concern, particularly in
light of the Supreme Court's most recent case
involving patronage practices.
In Rutan, the Court extended Elrod and Branti to
hold that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after
layoffs based on political affiliation or support"
impermissibly infringe the First Amendment rights of
public employees. The Rutan Court's reasoning
undermines part of the Seventh and Third Circuits'
rationales in their independent contractor cases. The
Court dismissed the argument that expanding the
protections of Elrod and Branti would lead to
"excessive interference [in state employment] by the
Federal Judiciary."
The Court further explained that governmental
interests in efficiency and effectiveness can still be
preserved by "discharging, demoting, or transferring
staff members whose work is deficient" and by
permitting the selection or dismissal of "certain
high-level employees on the basis of their political
views." The Court stated the overriding principle as
follows: "The First Amendment prevents the
government, except in the most compelling
circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere
with its employees' freedom to believe and associate,
or to not believe and not associate." It therefore
"precludes the government from accomplishing
indirectly" that which it cannot command directly.
Arguably, in permitting governments to terminate a
public contract because of the contractor's speech,
courts have permitted governments to accomplish
indirectly that which they cannot accomplish
directly-punishment of speech that they do not like.
Indeed, it is indisputable that in its role as sovereign,
the government cannot punish or otherwise burden the
speech of citizens criticizing the government, except
in very limited circumstances. Under current Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the government, in its role as
employer, can only punish or burden speech of its
employees criticizing the government when it shows
that such speech interferes with the government's
ability to function. In permitting just that kind of
punishment or burdening of speech by independent
contractors, courts accord those who contract with the
government a lesser degree of First Amendment
protection than ordinary citizens enjoy vis-a-vis their
government or than government employees enjoy
vis-a-vis their employer.
The other rationale behind LaFalce and Horn was
premised on differences between public employees and
independent contractors. Some of these differences
are open to question, while others are undeniably true.
Whether or not these are relevant distinctions, for
example, independent contractors generally have more
discretion and control over the performance of their
jobs than do employees, and in that respect some may
be more like the high-level policymaking employees
who are still subject to patronage dismissals under
Rutan, Elrod, and Branti. Still others function in a
way very similar to employees.
On the other hand, much of the LaFalce and Horn
rationale for treating independent contractors
differently from employees rests on the assumption
that independent contractors have less at stake than an
employee, and the loss of a contract is less devastating
than the loss of ajob. While that is undeniably true in
some cases, as it was in Horn, we have seen no
empirical data that it is always or even usually the
case. And with the increasing "privatization" of
government, more and more of the government's work
is accomplished through independent contractors,
thereby increasing both the number and variety of
such contractual arrangements.
We of course recognize that there is a long and
vital tradition of treating independent contractors
differently from employees in many legal contexts. In
this First Amendment context, we reject any
categorical distinctions based on whether independent
contractors have more or less of an economic interest
in their governmental contracts, both because such
categorical distinctions are impossible to make and
because, in this context, they are irrelevant. There is
little justification for a rule that the magnitude of the
loss determines whether an individual's First
Amendment rights have been violated. As the
dissenting opinion in Horn pointed out, "The
constitutional wrong condemned in Elrod and Branti
was the state's attempt to control the beliefs and
associations of its citizens. That control can be just as
effective and offensive when the state reduces a
citizen's income by twenty percent as when the state
reduces the citizen's income by one hundred percent."
And Rutan's extension of protection against patronage
practices to a variety of employment practices short of
dismissal undermines the argument that only the
complete loss of one's joo merits First Amendmient
protection.
In sum, of the two rationales behind decisions
such as LaFalce and Horn, which deny independent
contractors the First Amendment protections enjoyed
by public employees, the first rationale--the Supreme
Court's cautious restriction of patronage practices in
government employment--has been undermined by
Rutan and has limited relevance to whether
independent contractors should be protected against
retaliation for speech on matters of public concern.
The second rationale-presumed differences between
the status of independent contractors and
employees-is of questionable empirical validity and of
dubious relevance to the question of whether First
Amendment rights have been violated. Neither one
explains why independent contractors should be given
less First Amendment protection than either ordinary
citizens or government employees. We therefore
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specifically hold, as we assumed in Abercrombie, that
an independent contractor is protected under the First
Amendment from retaliatory governmental action, just
as an employee would be. Thus, the Pickering
balancing test would apply to such a retaliatory action.
We realize that this decision places us squarely in
conflict with several other circuits, a posture we do not
adopt lightly. We also agree with the Seventh and
Third Circuits that this is an area in which Supreme
Court guidance is particularly needed.
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND this
case for further proceedings consistent herewith. All
pending motions are DENIED.
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FREE SPEECH FOR PUBLIC CONTRACTORS?
The News & Observer Raleigh, NC
Monday, May 1, 1995
James J. Kilpatrick
Universal Press Syndicate
Charleston, S.C. - Suppose, to be supposing, that you
are an independent contractor who runs a
trash-hauling business in Kansas. Or suppose you
operate a wrecker service in Texas.
Suppose, further, that you open your big fat
mouth and publicly criticize the government that
awards your contract. Suppose, finally, that the
government retaliates by ceasing to do business with
you.
Has your constitutional right to free speech been
abridged? The Supreme Court never has addressed the
question squarely, but the time is close at hand when
the court will have to take it up. The circuit courts of
appeals have split dramatically on the issue.
The law as to public employees has changed
greatly in recent years. There was a time when
government jobs came and went with partisan winds.
The whole idea, as some sage observed, was to throw
their rascals out so we can throw our rascals in. Any
worker who spoke out of line was likely to be fired.
The First Amendment's protection of free speech never
entered anyone's mind.
Things are different now. Congress passed a Civil
Rights Act. Lawyers resurrected a Reconstruction
statute known as Section 1983. Now public
employees may speak their minds freely and critically
on any subject of public concern - including the
incompetence of their higher-ups. But if the speech
causes disruption, they may be fired in retaliation.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit
affirmed this principle on April 4 in the case of
Leonard Jeffiies, a flambovant nrofessor at City
College in New York. He opened his big mouth with
anti-Semitic tirades, and the college stripped him of
his position as a department head. Jeffries' speech was
clearly disruptive.
Three Supreme Court cases have erected
milestones for public employees. The first involved
Marvin L. Pickering, a schoolteacher in Illinois. He
publicly criticized his local school board. In 1968 the
high court said he could not be disciplined for
speaking out. Pickering stayed on.
The second case, in 1983, concerned Sheila
Myers, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans.
She was transferred for circulating an interoffice
questionnaire that got everyone upset. The high court
held that this was insubordination, not free speech.
Myers was out.
In the third case, a college teacher in Texas,
Robert Sinderman, lost his contract after he criticized
the State Board of Regents. The high court held in
1972 that he couldn't be sacked for that reason. Free
speech came first.
So much for the free speech rights of public
employees. Short of disruptive speech that diminishes
the efficiency of an agency, people in government may
gripe their heads off.
What about the free speech rights of independent
contractors? The contractors never used to have any.
Government employers could terminate contracts with
every change in party control. Republican bricklayers
could expect no contracts from a Democratic mayor,
and vice versa.
That picture is changing rapidly. On Jan. 4, the
10th U.S. Circuit came down solidly on the side of
Keen A. Umbehr, who contracted with Wabaunsee
County to haul trash for cities in the county. The
contract was automatically renewed every year.
But Umbehr had a way of popping off. He spoke
out at meetings of the county commission; he wrote
letters to local newspapers; he complained of landfill
user rates. He became a first-rate pain in the neck. Or
elsewhere. The county terminated his contract.
Umbehr sued.
He lost in U.S. District Court but won hands
down on appeal. The 10th Circuit saw no reason why
independent contractors should be given less First
Amendment protection than government employees.
The county is appealing to the Supreme Court.
On Jan. 12, the 5th Circuit considered the case of
Jimmy Blackburn. He had an arrangement with the
city of Marshall, Texas, for providing wrecker
services. Then he clashed with the chief of police
about bidding procedures, and the chief dropped him
from the list of approved wreckers. The District Court
dismissed his plea of free speech, but the 5th Circuit
ordered the lower court to look again.
It is not like the old days. Government may not
punish the free speech of anyone. Patronage is the
mother's milk of politics, but with decisions like the
Umbehr case in Kansas, the milk is turning pretty
sour.
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94-1930 ASSOCIATION OF NATIONAL
ADVERTISERS INC. v. LUNGREN
"Green marketing" laws-First Amendment.
Ruling below (CA 9, 44 F.3d 726, 63 LW
2348):
California law that makes it unlawful for man-
ufacturer or distributor of consumer goods to
represent that its products are "ozone friendly,"
"biodegradable," "photodegradable," "recycla-
ble," or "recycled," unless goods meet statute's
definitions of those terms, directly advances
state's substantial interests in consumer protec-
tion and conservation and therefore does not
unduly restrict commercial speech in violation of
First Amendment.
Questions presented: (I) May state, consistent-
ly with First Amendment, prohibit manufacturers
and distributors from using specific language
about environmental attributes of their consumer
goods, except as specifically prescribed by state,
even though language is truthful and not mislead-
ing? (2) May state, consistently with First
Amendment, prohibit manufacturers and distrib-
utors from using specific language about environ-
mental attributes of their consumer goods, except
as specifically prescribed by state, at same time
their critics are permitted to use identical lan-
guage about same goods in unrestricted manner?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/24/95, by Floyd
Abrams, of New York, N.Y., aod Susan Buckley,
Katherine B. Harrison, JonathaTDonnellan, and
Cahill Gordon & Reindel.
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'GREEN' PROPOSAL SLAMMED
Business Wants New 'Recycled' Definition
The Sacramento Bee
Copyright 1995
Saturday, June 3, 1995
Ilana DeBare
Bee Staff Writer
Business groups and environmentalists are facing
off over a new legislative effort to bring California's
"green marketing" laws into line with those of the rest
of the country.
Environmentalists claim that business lobbyists
are trying to water down the state's tough standards for
environmental label information, such as the rules
governing when a product can legally be called
"recycled."
"If this bill passes, there will be companies
advertising products as 'recycled' without having to
use any of the materials that consumers are commonly
recycling," said Lance King, a spokesman for
Californians Against Waste, a non-profit group that
promotes recycling.
But business groups and their legislative allies
say they are just trying to bring a little order to a
confusing situation - where companies face one set of
environmental labeling guidelines under California
law and a different set from the Federal Trade
Conunission.
"I don't think it's a matter of more stringent or less
stringent - it's just a question of having a uniform
standard," said Sen. Tim Leslie, R-Carnelian Bay,
author of SB426, the labeling reform bill that was
approved by the state Senate last week.
The state's environmental labeling laws go back
to 1990, when the 20th anniversary of Earth Day was
accompanied by a rush of companies advertising their
products as "recycled," "recyclable," "biodegradable"
and "environmentally friendly."
Trying to weed out false claims from true,
California passed the first set of "green labeling"
standards in the country. Business groups including
the California Chamber of Commerce have tried
unsuccessfully to overturn the state standards in court
- appealing their case just last week to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the FTC passed its own set of green
labeling guidelines, which were gradually adopted by
nearly every other state in the country.
Environmentalists claim that California's
standards remain stronger than the federal ones,
particularly in the area of defining what is a "recycled"
product.
California requires that "recycled" items contain
at least 10 percent post-consumer waste - meaning
everyday materials like recycled cans, bottles or office
paper, rather than industrial by-products like wood
pulp or paper trimmings.
The FTC guidelines, on the other hand, don't
require any specific amount of post-consumer waste.
They allow the term "recycled" for items including
any amount of any kind of re-used material, although
they also suggest that companies state how much pre-
and post-consumer material they are including.
Leslie's bill would bring California's standards
into line with the FTC guidelines.
Backers claim that it would allow companies to
offer more products with environmental labels, by
eliminating the obstacle of different standards in
different states.
But opponents deny that California's existing
standards have dampened the use of environmental
labels.
Having passed the Senate, SB426 is now slated
to be heard by the Assembly's consumer protection
committee.
251
94-2022 LOUISIANA v. SCHIRMER
Ban on election day campaigning-Campaign-free
zone around polling places.
Ruling below (La SupCt, 646 So.2d 890):
Louisiana statute that totally bans all political
activity, even that unrelated to matters on ballot,
within 600 feet of polling place on election days
furthers state's compelling interest in protecting
its citizens' right to vote, but significantly im-
pinges free speech and is overbroad, and thus
violates First Amendment; provision of statute
that criminalizes remaining within 600 feet of
polling place "after having been directed, in writ-
ing, by an election commissioner or law enforce-
ment officer to leave the premises or area of a
polling place" is unconstitutionally vague insofar
as it fails to set forth adequate guidelines govern-
ing when and under what circumstances provision
is to be enforced.
Questions presented: (1) Is Louisiana's elec-
tioneering law, LSA-R.S. 18:1462A, (3) & (4),
constitutional in its ban on political campaigning
on election day for matters both on and not on
day's ballot and in its prohibition of use of cam-
paign paraphernalia such as signs, pictures, and
other forms of political advertising for both ballot
and non-ballot matters to distance of 600 feet
from polling place on election day? (2) Is Louisi-
ana's compelling interest in maintaining cam-
paign-free zone around its polling places during
elections best served by its total ban on all politi-
cal campaigning? (3) Is 600-foot limitation in
Section 1462 narrowly tailored to protect Louisi-
ana's compelling interest? (4) Is LSA-R.S.
18:1462 overbroad? (5) Is LSA-R.S. 18:1462A
(2) void for vagueness?
Petition for certiorari filed 6/7/95, by Richard
P. leyoub, La. Atty. Gen., Doug Moreau, Dist.
Atty. for 19th Judicial Dist., and James M. Ross
and Roy A. Mongrue Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen.
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COURT KILLS POLLING PLACE ACTIVITY BAN
The Baton Rouge Advocate
Copyright 1994 by Capital City Press
Thursday, December 1, 1994
Joe Gyan Jr.
New Orleans Bureau
New Orleans - The state Supreme Court
narrowly struck down Louisiana's
election-day ban on all political activities
within 600 feet of polling places
Wednesday, saying the statute is
unconstitutionally broad and vague.
A federal appellate court declared the
same statute constitutional last year.
In its 4-3 ruling, though, the
Louisiana high court let stand a portion
of the law that prohibits voter
solicitation, within 600 feet of a polling
place, involving any candidate or matter
on the ballot.
In the 600-foot campaign-free zone
case involving Recall '92 organizer Ted
Schirmer, state District Judge Ralph
Tyson of Baton Rouge struck down the
law as unconstitutionally broad in July
1993.
Two months later, a panel of the 5th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Orleans ruled in Schirmer's federal case
that Louisiana's 600-foot campaign-free
zone is constitutional.
Baton Rouge lawyer Mark Upton,
who represents Schirmer, suggested that
different results were reached in the state
Supreme Court and 5th Circuit because
the state suit dealt with a criaiiail
prosecution while the federal suit dealt
with civil rights.
As far as Louisianians are concerned,
Upton said, the Louisiana high court's
decision is "supreme" because a state law
was at issue.
"The state Supreme Court governs
those activities," he said. "That's the law
we go by."
Schirmer, who was leading a
statewide drive to force a recall election
of Gov. Edwards, was cited with a
misdemeanor by Baton Rouge police in
October 1992 for trying to collect recall
signatures near a polling place at Lee
High School. Neither the recall nor
Edwards was on the ballot.
In striking down the law, Tyson also
threw out Schirmer's citation. The state
Supreme Court did the same Wednesday.
"We find it sufficient to say that in
establishing a 600-foot boundary which
proscribes all manner of political speech,
not just speech related to matters on the
ballot, Louisiana has crossed that
(constitutional) line," Chief Justice
Pascal Calogero Jr. wrote for the
majority.
The 5th Circuit said in September
1993 that the 600-foot limitation is "not
an excessive infringement on the First
Amendment." The court said the
Louisiana law bans all politicking, not
just recall activities.
The state Supreme Court, however,
found the ban to be "an
unconstitutionally overbroad
infringement upon the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution."
A spokesman for state Attorney
General Richard leyoub said the Attorney
General's Office had not seen
Wednesday's decision and would not
comment on the ruling's implications
until it had a chance to review it.
ICYUUU b UULC; I1a3 UIVU UJLIUIL U1i
asking the state Supreme Court to rehear
or reconsider the case.
Schirmer, a former Baton Rouge
lawyer now living in California, was not
available for comment.
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94-1850 CZEKAJ v. CALIFORNIA
Anti-abortion protest-Municipal "bubble ordi-
nance"-First Amendment.
Ruling below (Calif SuperCt SantaBarbara
Cty, 1/6/95):
Municipal ordinance that creates 8-foot dem-
onstration-free zone or "bubble" around drive-
ways of medical care facilities, places of worship,
and persons entering those places, Mun. Code
Section 9.99.030, is content-neutral, narrowly tai-
lored to serve legislative goal of preserving access
to target locations, alid is even more narrowly
drawn than injunction upheld against First
Amendment attack in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, 62 LW 4686 (US SupCt 1994),
which dealt with injunction that created 36-foot
buffer around entrances of clinic; existence of
history of illegal acts in Madsen is not constitu-
tionally significant and merely reflects differ-
ences between injunction and ordinance; orders
dismissing charges against defendants for violat-
ing ordinance are reversed.
Question presented: Does ordinance that pro-
hibits "all expressive or symbolic conduct, wheth-
er active or passive" on public sidewalk at drive-
way or within eight feet of driveway of any
self-selected health care facility or place of wor-
ship amount to unconstitutional restriction on
protected First Amendment activity?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/8/95, by Michael
D. Imfeld, of Tarzana. Calif., Craig Peter T. S.
Cornell, of Rolling Hills, Calif., John Q. Mastel-
lar and Lowthorp. Richards, McMillan, Miller,
Conway & Templcman P.C., both of Oxnard,
Calif., and Catherine W. Short and Life Legal
Defense Foundation, both of Napa, Calif.
94-1867 AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE INC. v.
RENO
Abortion-Constitutionality of Freedom of Ac-
cess to Clinic Entrances Act.
Ruling below (CA 4, 47 F.3d 642, 63 LW
2538):
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act,
which criminalizes use of force, threat of force, or
physical obstruction to injure, intimidate, or in-
terfere with any person obtaining or providing
reproductive health services, or to attempt to do
so, is within Congress' Commerce Clause power
and does not violate First Amendment's Free
Speech or Free Exercise Clauses, or 1993 Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act.
Questions presented: (1) Did Congress have
constitutional authority under Commerce Clause,
Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment, and Tenth
Amendment to enact 1994 Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act, 18 USC 248, which, inter
alia, makes criminal, and subject to civil dam-
ages, even non-violent physical obstruction of en-
trances to reproductive health services? (2) Did
Congress, in enacting FACE Act, abridge free-
dom of expression protected by First Amendment
by creating content- and viewpoint-based restric-
tions upon political expression? (3) Did Congress,
in enacting FACE Act, violate petitioners' rights
under First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause
and terms of Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
42 USC 2000bb, et seq.?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/12/95, by Mar-
ion Edwyn Harrison and Daniel M. Redmond,
both of Falls Church, Va.
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FREE-SPEECH ATTACK ON CLINIC LAW FAILS
Abortion Access: Ruling Is a Setback for Opponents,
Who Say it Squelches Peaceful Protest.
Atlanta Constitution
Tuesday, June 20, 1995
Associated Press
Washington - The Supreme Court rejected a
free-speech challenge Monday to the year-old federal
law that protects access to abortion clinics.
The justices, without comment, left intact an
appeals court ruling in a Virginia case that said the
law does not infringe on anyone's freedom of
expression while protecting people who seek or
provide abortions.
Eight federal trial judges and two federal appeals
courts have upheld the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, but a federal judge in Wisconsin has
declared it unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court action did not resolve the
issue definitively, but it was a setback for
anti-abortion activists who say the law aimed at
deterring violence and intimidation squelches peaceful
protest as well.
The court refused to hear an appeal filed by
Concerned Women for America and one of its
members.
But still pending before the justices is a challenge
to the clinic- access law by another anti-abortion
group, the American Life League.
"Our appeal raises the free-speech issue but also
argues that Congress lacked the authority to enact
such legislation because no interstate commerce was
involved," said Marion Harrison, an American Life
League lawyer. "We think that's a hot-ticket issue with
the Supreme Court right now."
The high court in April struck down a federal law
that made it a crime to have a gun within 1,000 feet of
a public school. The court said Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce didn't stretch that far.
Abortion rights advocates welcomed Monday's
action.
"FACE has been a highly effective tool against
abortion clinic violence," said Deborah Ellis of the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Kate Michelman of the National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League said the law
"does not restrict free speech, but it does punish
harmful conduct."
"Anti-choice protesters must recognize that
opposition to abortion is not a license to stalk, bomb,
threaten, harass, intimidate or murder doctors and
women," Michelman said.
President Clinton signed the law May 24, 1994.
That same day, the two anti-abortion groups sued in
Alexandria, Va., in an attempt to have the law
invalidated.
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema threw out
both lawsuits, and the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld her ruling in February.
Concerned Women's appeal said the challenged
law "is the only federal statute designed to regulate
political protests of only one selected movement, the
pro-life movement, at one selection site, abortion
clinics."
"It is therefore unconstitutional content-and
viewpoint-based discrimination," the appeal argued.
Justice Department lawyers urged the court to
reject the appeal.
They said Congress enacted the law "in response
to a nationwide campaign of violent and obstructive
interference with access to reproductive health
services."
From 1977 through the spring of 1993, more than
1,000 acts of violence against abortion providers were
reported. They included at least 36 bombings, 81
arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, two
kidnappings, 327 clinic invasions, 71 chemical
attacks and one murder.
Last summer, abortion opponent Paul Hill fatally
shot a doctor who performed abortions and a security
escort at a Florida clinic. John Salvi is charged with
killing two people last December in attacks on two
Massachusetts clinics.
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CLINIC LAW RULING MAY SPUR LEGAL FIGHT
The Milwaukee Journal
Copyright 1995
Friday, March 17, 1995
Jeff Cole
The Journal Staff
Federal Judge Rudolph Randa's ruling that the
governments chief weapon for protecting reproductive
health clinics is unconstitutional will set the stage for
a major court battle, one of the attorneys involved in
the case said.
"This will be a major legal battle over judicial
power vs. congressional power," said attorney Alex
Flynn, who represents anti- abortion protester James
Ketchum. "It is the first time in a long time that a
judge has said to Congress, 'You are going too far.' "
The issue ultimately will be decided by the US
Supreme Court, Flynn said.
Randa ruled that the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act did not meet any test of
constitutionality he could find. Randa is the first judge
in the United States to find the law unconstitutional.
The ruling contradicts those of seven other district
judges and the federal appeals court in Richmond, Va.
Among those finding the FACE Act constitutional
was Randa's fellow Wisconsin federal judge, J.P.
Stadtmueller.
"I am not terribly concerned about the ruling. It
appears to be an aberration," said Severa Austin,
president of Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin. "There
are eight other judicial opinions which uphold this
law. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United
States will have to decide this issue."
APPEAL SOUGHT
US Attorney Thomas P. Schneider said he already
has asked for permission from the US Department of
Justice to appeal the ruling.
Said Barbara Lyons, of Wisconsin Right to Life:
"We felt that the bill itself was overkill in its potential
infringement on free speech activities, of those who
want to engage in non-violent activities and who
merely want to counsel [those seeking abortions].
"We have felt all along that the scope of FACE
was so broad that it could reach to activities even such
as ours, simply to advocate for the rights of unborn
children."
In ruling that FACE was unconstitutional, Randa
dismissed the charges of violating the act against John
Stambaugh, Ketchum and Robert Braun, all of
Milwaukee; George Wilson, of Sheboygan; Michael
Skott, of South Milwaukee; and Daniel Balint, of
Oostburg.
The six were arrested for their part in an abortion
protest at the Wisconsin Women's Health Care
Center, 8634 W. Brown Deer Road, on Sept. 29. They
allegedly blockaded the clinic entrances and were
arrested by the FBI.
Stambaugh, Wilson, Balint and Ketchum remain
in federal custody. Their attorneys have filed motions
asking them to be released because they no longer face
federal charges.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ISSUE
In his ruling, Randa noted that in passing the
FACE Act, Congress had relied on its constitutional
authority to regulate interstate commerce. Randa noted
that while Congress had great power to use the
Commerce Clause as it saw fit, that power was not
unlimited.
For Congress to use the Commerce Clause, the
activity it seeks to regulate must have some relation to
interstate commerce, Randa noted.
The 10th Amendment specifically states that any
power not delegated to federal government by the
Constitution and not constitutionally prohibited
belongs to the states.
While some people may cross state lines to obtain
abortions, Randa said, there is no rational way to find
that abortion affects interstate commerce.
"If some people cross state lines to go golfing,
bowling, camping or shopping, can Congress regulate
these activities?" Randa asked.
Regulating abortion protests is a state problem
because there is simply no way the Constitution
allows the federal government to do so, Randa
concluded.
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94-2062 NATIONAL CITY, CALIF. v.
RATTRAY
Public official-Proof of falsity by preponderance
of evidence.
Ruling below (CA 9, 51 F.3d 793):
Although New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), required that allegedly defamed
public officials prove actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence, other elements of defama-
tion, including falsity, may be proved by prepon-
derance of evidence; accordingly, court reverses
summary judgment against plaintiff, former po-
lice officer, who was required to show by clear
and convincing evidence that his supervisor's al-
legedly defamatory statement about him was
false.
Question presented: Did Ninth Circuit err in
holding that public official who brings defama-
tion action need only prove falsity of allegedly
defamatory statement at issue by preponderance
of evidence, in light of this court's imposition of
"convincing clarity" standard of proof in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and Second Circuit's
view that falsity must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence?
Petition for certiorari filed 6/16/95, by Rich-
ard R. Terzian, Kristin A. Pelletier, and Le-
Boeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae L.L.P., all of
Los Angeles, Calif.
94-1937 COALITION FOR FREE AND OPEN
ELECTIONS v. McELDERRY
Ban on write-in votes for president.
Ruling below (CA 10, 48 F.3d 493):
Oklahoma law that bans write-in voting in
presidential elections does not violate First or
Fourteenth Amendment.
Questions presented: (1) Does Oklahoma's ban
on write-in voting in presidential elections consti-
tute discriminatory regulation of presidential
elections so as to make law constitutionally in-
firm? (2) Would requiring declaration of candi-
dacy for write-in candidates for president backed
up with slate of electors allow write-in voting in
presidential election in such manner as to avoid
expending funds to count ballots for fictitious
candidates and/or electors or those unwilling or
unqualified to serve?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/25/95, by James
C. Linger, and Butler & Linger, both of Tulsa,
Okla.
94-1247 HOSPITALITY INVESTMENTS OF
PHILADELPHIA INC. v. PENNSYLVANIA
STATE POLICE
Ban on price advertising-First Amendment.
Ruling below (Pa SupCt, 650 A.2d 863):
Pennsylvania ban against price advertising of
many alcoholic beverages does not violate First
Amendment; Twenty First Amendment confers
broad authority on states to impose conditions
and limitations on privilege of selling alcoholic
beverages that are reasonably related to liquor
control.
Questions presented: (1) Does Twenty First
Amendment strip commercial speech concerning
alcohol beverages of all First Amendment protec-
tion, thereby reducing judicial scrutiny of Penn-
sylvania's ban on price advertising from rigorous
test under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980), to whether ban "bearfs] a reasonable
relation to the evil sought to be controlled"? (2)
Does Pennsylvania's ban on price advertising for
alcohol beverages violate First Amendment, par-
ticularly when government (a) omits its own
advertising from that ban, (b) introduced no
evidence that its ban will directly and materially
advance its asserted purpose of reducing excessive
consumption, and (c) contradictorily concluded in
1985 that price advertising for beer does not
cause increased consumption?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/20/95, by John J.
Walsh, Steven G. Brody, Mary Elizabeth Taylor,
and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, all of
New York, N.Y., Garry F. DiVito, of Philadcl-
phia, Pa., and P Cameron DeVore, and Davis
Wright Tremaine, both of Seattle, Wash.
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COURTS STRUGGLE WITH DEFINITION OF CYBERSPACE
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
Thursday, July 27, 1995
Constance Johnson
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
While lawmakers debate ways to regulate
cyberspace, courts are grappling with a more basic
question: how to define on-line services.
The definition is crucial in determining the rights
and responsibilities of the services under existing
laws. Already one court has decided that Prodigy
Services Co. is a publisher and therefore can be held
responsible for an allegedly libelous statement posted
by a subscriber. But another court has determined that
H&R Block Inc.'s CompuServe is a passive conduit of
information like a library and therefore can't be held
liable.
Courts have always taken a while to figure out
how to apply old laws to new technologies. It took
nearly 40 years for the Supreme Court to decide that
the First Amendment covered movies.
This time, some of the services are adding to the
legal confusion by routinely deleting copyrighted
materials from their bulletin boards but at the same
time vigorously denying their responsibility for
libelous statements posted by subscribers. Their
explanation: Zapping copyrighted materials in
response to requests from copyright holders isn't the
same thing as exercising editorial, control.
"They are trying to have it both ways," says Jacob
H. Zamansky, who is representing an investment firm
in the libel suit against Prodigy, a joint venture of
International Business Machines Corp. and Sears,
Roebuck & Co. "If they are going to exercise editorial
control, then they have to accept the responsibilities
that come along with it."
ln UIC PigA~y casN, a N YI state cuLrtLJUU
ruled in May that Prodigy can be sued for libel
because it acts as a publisher and is therefore
responsible for the content of subscribers' electronic
messages. The judge noted that Prodigy had marketed
itself as a family service and reserved the right to edit
the content of messages, even using a software system
to remove obscenities before they were posted.
Prodigy has asked the judge to allow it to reargue the
case. The company has hired a new attorney, Martin
Garbus of New York, who says he has evidence that
Prodigy doesn't edit postings.
Partly in response to the Prodigy case, Republican
Rep. Chris Cox of California and Democratic Rep.
Ron Wyden of Oregon are sponsoring legislation that
would shield on-line services from liability, even if
they use software or other measures to keep obscene
materials off their services. The proposed legislation
wouldn't shield the services from responsibility for
violations of criminal or copyright laws.
At the moment, case law suggests that on-line
services can avoid liability by taking a hands-off
approach. In a 1991 libel case involving CompuServe,
a federal judge ruled that CompuServe was "in
essence, an electronic for-profit library" because it had
little or no editorial control over the content of bulletin
boards; thus, it could not be held responsible for any
libelous material.
But cyberlaw experts point out that many on-line
services have to do some form of monitoring, even if
only to ensure that the gardening club forum sticks to
gardening tips. "This is a legal conundrum," says
Peter Drew Kennedy of the law firm George,
Donaldson & Ford in Austin, Texas, which represents
several on-line service providers.
Mr. Kennedy says these providers "don't want to
monitor any content at all, but they are worried about
the liability for whatever flows through the machine.
... They may be able to get rid of the most obvious
material and protect themselves from liability for that;
but by taking control over the content, do they become
a publisher?"
David Menken, an attorney for several on-line
services including Physicians' Online Inc., says his
clients are "trying to create an environment where
people freely express their ideas" and "do not want to
monitor."
A spokeswoman for Physicians' Online says it
doesn't monitor. Referring to Physicians' Online, Mr.
Vielnken ass :L "IlmetUhi wicoe Un uIe service
which appears to be wrong or defamatory or harmful,
what do we do? If we leave it on, am I liable? If I take
it off, and thereby impugn the character of the doctor
who put it on, am I liable to him?"
Court rulings will eventually answer these
questions. Meanwhile, when it comes to copyright
infringement, one court has said that on-line operators
are responsible, no matter what they do. In a case
involving Playboy magazine photographs, a federal
judge in Florida found George Frena, a bulletin-board
operator, liable for infringement. Mr. Frena said that
he was unaware that subscribers had posted the
pictures and that he removed them once he learned
about them. But the judge said "even an innocent
infringer is liable for infringement," in his 1993
ruling. After the ruling, Mr. Frena reached a
confidential settlement agreement with Playboy.
258
But CompuServe, in another copyright-
infringement case, is trying to convince a federal court
in New York that it is a passive conduit for
information and shouldn't be held liable for songs that
appear on a music forum managed by someone else.
Given the volume of materials that services such as
CompuServe handle, CompuServe attorneys argue
that it is not only impractical but virtually impossible
to check everything for copyright violations.
The suit was brought by Frank Music Corp.,
which is seeking payment for every time the song
"Unchained Melody" was downloaded by subscribers
to a bulletin board offered by CompuServe.
(CompuServe also says Frank Music has no claim
against it because the materials were downloaded for
private use.)
NetCom On-Line Communications Services Inc.,
which provides access to the Internet, is defending
itself in a copyright-infringement suit brought by the
Church of Scientology. NetCom contends that it was
unable to determine if postings by a subscriber were
copyrighted and that it would thus risk violating a
subscriber's free speech rights by removing them.
The postings contained excerpts from the works
of Scientology church founder L. Ron Hubbard
interspersed with commentary from an ex-member of
the church, says Randy Rice, an attorney for NetCom.
The church requested the postings' removal; when
NetCom refused, the church sued the company, the
bulletin-board service and the subscriber who had
posted the message. The case is pending in federal
court in San Jose, Calif.
A recent decision by the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals reflects the frustration of some judges.
"Applying libel laws to cyberspace or computer
networks entails rewriting statutes that were written to
manage physical, printed objects, not computer
networks or services," the court wrote, in overturning
a lower-court decision in a defamation case. "It is for
the legislature to address the increasingly common
phenomenon of libel and defamation on the
information superhighway."
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